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Does culture have a causal effect on economic development? The data on European regions 
suggest that it does. Culture is measured by indicators of individual values and beliefs, such 
as trust and respect for others, and confidence in individual self-determination. To isolate the 
exogenous variation in culture, I rely on two historical variables used as instruments: the 
literacy rate at the end of the XIXth century, and the political institutions in place over the 
past several centuries. The political and social history of Europe provides a rich source of 
variation in these two variables at a regional level. The exogenous component of culture due 
to history is strongly correlated with current regional economic development, after controlling 
for contemporaneous education, urbanization rates around 1850 and national effects. 
Moreover, the data do not reject the over-identifying assumption that the two historical 
variables used as instruments only influence regional development through culture. The 
indicators of culture used in this paper are also strongly correlated with economic 
development and with available measures of institutions in a cross-country setting. 
JEL Code: O10, F10, P10, N13. 





IGIER Bocconi University 






I am grateful to Simon Johnson for giving me historical data on city size, to Daron Acemoglu, 
Fabio Canova, Antonio Ciccone, Carlo Favero, Eliana La Ferrara, Ross Levine, Andrea 
Ichino, Luca Sala, Andrei Shleifer, Roman Wacziarg and participants in seminars at Berkeley, 
Catholic University in Milan, CIAR, ESSIM, the European University Institute, Harvard, 
IGIER, the IMF and NBER for helpful comments, to Elena Besedina, Marcello Miccoli and 
Massimiliano Onorato for outstanding research assistance, and to Bocconi University, CIAR 
and MIUR for financial support.   1
1. Introduction 
It has become almost commonplace to view history as the main determinant of current 
economic development.  Exploiting cross country comparisons and following up on Hall 
and Jones (1999), an influential paper by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) has 
shown that colonial origin (measured by mortality rates amongst early European settlers 
in the New World) is strongly correlated with current economic performance.  In a 
similar vein, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) have argued that 
indicators of legal origin explain policy performance in the post-war period.   
  But what is the source of this legacy of history? A widespread interpretation is 
that history shapes current economic performance through “institutions”.  Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that colonial origin is correlated with indicators of 
the quality of current institutions, in particular of institutions protecting property rights 
from the abuse of governments. Based on instrumental variable estimation, they show 
that the “exogenous” variation in current institutions due to history explains current 
economic development. Moreover, they cannot reject the hypothesis that all the effect of 
history, as measured by colonial origin, is fully captured by current institutions.
1 Several 
subsequent papers have confirmed the robustness of these findings, showing that the 
same colonial origin data also explain a host of policy or political failures in the post-war 
period, and that the historical variables swamp the effect of almost any other variable 
affecting current economic performance.
2   
  The idea that history influences current development through institutions is 
powerful and appealing. Institutions are a fundamental determinant of the incentives of 
private individuals to innovate and invest. Institutions also remain in place for long 
periods of time, and thus they are a natural candidate to explain the legacy of history. An 
active and promising line of research is now engaged in pinning down more precisely the 
most relevant features of institutions (which specific institutions are critical for growth 
and development), and to explain the sources of institutional inertia (how do historical 
institutions influence the evolution of current institutions) – see in particular the research 
reviewed by Helpman (2004). 
  But “institutions” is often used as a catch-all concept that means different things 
to different people. In a narrow interpretation, institutions can be thought of as the formal 
                                                 
1 Acemoglu D. and S. Johnson (2003) also argue for the primacy of property rights institutions (as opposed 
to contractual institutions) and of colonial origin (as opposed to legal origin).  
2 See for instance Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003), Dollar and  Kraay (2003), 
Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002), Satyanath and Subramanian (2004).   2
rules of the game that shape individual incentives and constraints. In a broader 
interpretation, institutions also include systems of beliefs or social norms that sustain 
specific equilibria.
3 As pointed out by Glaeser et al. (2004), the existing literature 
implicitly subscribes to the broader interpretation, since it measures property right 
institutions or political institutions by outcome indicators, not by formal legal and 
constitutional codes. This makes it more difficult to sort out cause and effect. If the same 
formal institutions function very differently in different economic or social environments, 
then economic and institutional outcomes are jointly determined, and the view that 
institutions have an independent causal effect on economic development becomes more 
tenuous. Thus, Glaeser et al. (2004) suggest that the effect of history on current economic 
development reflects the accumulation of human capital, which in turn influences 
institutional outcomes, rather than the other way around. Referring to a long tradition in 
political science (eg. Lipset (1959)), they argue that education plays a key role in the 
evolution of institutions. Democracy functions well when citizens accept it as a legitimate 
instrument of conflict resolution, but this requires specific cultural traits and an educated 
population.
4 
This paper shares with Glaeser et al. (2004) the view that “culture” is a 
fundamental channel of historical influence, that can explain why the same formal 
institutions function so differently in different environments. But I try to go beyond the 
general claim that “culture” or measures of education influence economic development: I 
seek to estimate the effect of specific cultural traits, traditionally regarded as favourable 
to economic growth and to the effective functioning of democratic institutions.  
Culture is a vague concept, even more so than institutions. In the formal jargon of 
economists, culture can be translated as the social norms and the individual beliefs that 
sustain Nash equilibria as focal points in repeated social interactions (eg. Schotter 1981, 
Myerson 1991, Greif 1994).  In this interpretation, culture is one aspect of broadly 
defined institutions, and contributes to shape individual incentives. A more radical view 
is that culture directly influences individual behaviour through values and preferences 
(eg. Akerlof and Kranton 2000, Rabin 1993).  Others have pointed out that social norms 
and individual values could interact in systematic fashions (Bernheim 1994). This paper 
                                                 
3 Diermeier and Kriehbel (2003) provide a useful methodological discussion of how to explain political 
phenomena with theories based on institutions (narrowly defined as rules of the game).  
4 Exploiting cross-country correlations, Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that education favors the emergence of 
democratic institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2004) question this conclusion, showing 
that no such correlation exists within countries at intervals of five or ten years; but their results do not rule 
out a causal effect of education on democracy over a longer time horizon.      3
does not seek to discriminate between these alternative interpretations. Its goal is to show 
that specific indicators of culture, that can be interpreted either as social norms or as 
individual values, are correlated both with historical patterns and with current economic 
development.  
To put it a bit schematically, the line of research discussed above argues that: 
Historical institutions => Contemporary institutions => Economic development. In this 
view, the challenge for researchers is to identify specific features of institutions that 
persist over time and shape economic behavior. This paper instead explores the link: 
Historical institutions => Culture => Economic development, trying to identify specific 
cultural traits that are shaped by history and that influence current economic 
performance.  Of course, these different interpretations are not mutually exclusive, but 
can complement each other. Indeed, the same formal institutions can function very 
differently in different cultural environments. The judicial system works very differently 
in Southern and Northern Italy, for instance, with judges taking much longer to complete 
investigations and to rule on civil cases in the South than in the North. Yet, the legal 
system and the career path for judges have been the same for 150 years, and the human 
resources available are also not very different. Similar evidence applies to regional 
differences in the functioning of the public administration, or to moral hazard inside large 
private corporations with branches in different regions (Ichino and Maggi 1999).  
The key difficulty in estimating a causal effect of culture is that it is endogenous 
to economic development. As stressed by the so called modernization theory, economic 
development has predictable effects on culture and social life (eg. Inglehart and Baker 
2000). Hence, to identify a causal effect from culture to economic development, we have 
to find some exogenous source of variation in culture. The central idea in this paper is to 
apply a methodology similar to that of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), but to 
exploit variation amongst the European regions rather than across countries. The formal 
and legal institutions have been the same inside the European countries in our sample for 
150 years or more. Yet within several countries there is a variety of political histories.  
Controlling for country fixed effects removes the effect of the common national 
institutions. I then seek to explain whatever is left as the effect of history on culture, and 
then from culture to output.  
  I measure culture by aggregating at the regional level individual responses 
collected in the opinion polls of the World Value Surveys in the 1990s - Inglehart et al. 
(2000). I focus on specific indicators of individual values and beliefs, such as measures of   4
trust, of respect for others, of confidence in the link between individual effort and 
economic success. When measured at the country (rather than regional) level and for a 
large sample of countries, these indicators of culture are strongly correlated with 
available measures of institutions, and even with the colonial origin variables exploited in 
the cross-country studies mentioned above. But to reduce the scope of omitted variables, 
I focus on within country variation in Europe. After controlling for country fixed effects, 
contemporaneous regional education and urbanization rates in 1850, the cultural 
indicators are correlated with two historical variables: regional literacy rates at the end of 
the XIXth century, and indicators of political institutions in the period from 1600 to 1850.  
Historically more backward regions (with higher illiteracy rates and worst political 
institutions) tend to have specific cultural traits today: less trust in others, less respect for 
others, less confidence in the individual. Moreover, the component of culture explained 
by history is strongly correlated with current regional economic development, again after 
controlling for country fixed effects, contemporaneous regional education and past 
urbanization rates: less trust and respect for others and less confidence in the individual 
are associated with lower per capita output. Finally, the data do not reject the hypothesis 
that the effect of the two historical variables (literacy and past political institutions) on 
regional output only operates through culture.  
Of course, to interpret these correlations as causal, from history to culture to 
economic development, one has to rely on strong identifying assumptions that make 
history a valid instrument for culture in the output regressions. The validity of these 
assumptions is open to doubts and is extensively discussed below. But the evidence 
presented in this paper is not very different from that brought to bear in cross country 
studies in favour of institutions. Overall, the evidence does not point to a primacy of 
institutions (at least of formal institutions) over culture. Both cross country studies and 
regional comparisons point to a strong and robust influence of history on current 
economic performance. And these different samples support the view that culture as well 
as institutions are plausible channels of historical influence. 
  The view that culture is a fundamental determinant of economic development is 
not new. In an interesting paper, Greif (1994) stresses the interaction between culture and 
institutions; he points out how the different cultures of Maghribi and Genoese traders in 
the late medieval period led them to develop different institutions, and how this mattered 
for their subsequent development paths. Closer to the object of this study, two influential 
books (Banfield 1958 and Putnam 1993) have argued that the pronounced differences in   5
civic, social and economic behaviour between Northern and Southern Italy can be traced 
back to their distant histories and traditions, and that these different endowments of 
“social capital” in turn contribute to explain the economic backwardness of Southern 
Italy. This paper does not study in great detail the cultural differences between Northern 
and Southern Italy, but focuses on several European countries; this makes it possible to 
rely on more observations and hence to exploit more powerful quantitative and statistical 
techniques. Beugelsdijk, and von Schaik (2001) and Knack and Keefer (1997) perform a 
similar analysis for European regions and a sample of countries respectively, studying the 
correlation between indicators of social capital and per capita output.  But these papers do 
not attempt to link social capital to history or to account for the endogeneity of social 
capital.
5 An interesting recent paper by Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2004) studies 
the link between culture (as measured by researchers in cross-cultural psychology) and 
institutions (such as the rule of law and the control of corruption), in a sample of 
countries; to remove joint endogeneity, culture is instrumented by a linguistic variable 
that reflects the importance of the individual relative to the context of speech; despite the 
different methodologies and data sources, their empirical results are in line with those of 
this paper. Barro and McCleary (2003) provide evidence that religious beliefs are 
correlated with economic growth in a sample of countries, and through instrumental 
variable estimation they interpret this correlation as causal. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2004a) study the effect of social capital on individual financial habits. A recent paper by 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) finds that income differences between countries are 
positively correlated with genetic and geographic distance, and interpret this evidence as 
suggestive of cultural barriers to the diffusion of innovations across countries. Platteau 
(2000) provides an excellent discussion of other contributions that have studied the role 
of culture in other development contexts.
6  
  The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes data on regional output, 
education, past urbanization and culture, and shows that there is strong correlation 
                                                 
5 See also von Schaik  (2002) and Healy ((2003) for references to alternative measures of social capital in 
Europe or in larger international samples. 
6 Outside of this line of research in development economics, other recent microeconomic studies provide 
evidence that cultural traits are a crucial determinant of important individual economic decisions, such as 
female labor supply or educational and fertility decisions (Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti  2002, Fernandez, 
Fogli and Olivetti  2004), or international exchange (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2004b), or of decisions 
where trust plays an important role (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter 2000, Ichino,  Bornhorst, 
Schlag and Winter 2004). 
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between indicators of culture and of per capita output. This section also shows that these 
same indicators of culture are strongly correlated with economic development and with 
widely used measures of institutions in a large sample of countries. Section 3 introduces 
the regional historical variables that will be used as instruments for culture. Section 4 
outlines the estimation strategy and discusses the identifying assumptions. Section 5 
performs the basic statistical analysis, estimating the link from history to culture and then 
from culture to economic development. Section 6 discusses the robustness of the 
estimates, trying to address the crucial issues of the validity of the instruments and of the 
power of the over-identifying tests through Montecarlo simulations. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Data on output, education, urbanization and culture 
The sample consists of 69 regions in 8 European countries: France, Germany (except East 
Germany and Berlin), the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal.  The 
starting point for defining a region is the Eurostat data base on regional per capita output. 
Eurostat defines regions on the basis of administrative criteria. Different levels of 
disaggregation are possible. We start from what Eurostat defines as NUTS1 level (with 
population ranging from 3 to 7 millions) or NUTS 2 level (with population ranging from 
800.000 to 3 millions), with NUTS 1 being the preferred definition in most countries. 
Then we merged some of the smaller regions into larger aggregates, so as to have a 
sufficiently large cell of individually-based measures of culture within each region.  The 
first two columns of Table 2 list the regions in our sample. 
 
      2.1 Per capita output 
Current economic development is measured by per capita gross value added (GVA) in 
international prices (adjusted for purchasing power) and expressed in percent of the EU15 
average. This variable is available from the mid 1970s to 2001. The source is Cambridge 
Econometrics, that has done some minor adjustments to data originally collected in the 
Eurostat database Regio. All variables used in this paper and their sources are defined 
more precisely in the data appendix below.  
   Since culture is measured in the 1990s, we confine most of the analysis to the 
more recent period, taking the average of per capita GVA over the period 1995-2000. 
This variable, called yp9500, is the dependent variable in our analysis. But we also look 
at average yearly growth, defined as the average log difference of per capita GVA over   7
the whole period 1977-2000 – this variable is called growth.  In the growth regressions 
we also control for initial per capita GVA in 1977 (in logs) – this variable is called lyp77. 
  Figure 1 displays the regional pattern of per capita output at the end of the 1990s 
(to draw the map, we have divided the range of yp9500 into 8 equal intervals, but in the 
statistical analysis we always use the continuously measured variable). Per capita output 
is highest in the densely populated urban centers (the areas around Paris, Bruxelles, the 
urban areas in Nothern Germany, the regions of Northern Italy) while it is lowest in 
Southern Spain, Portugal and Southern Italy. Overall, there is considerable within country 
variation, and Italy stands out as the country with more pronounced inequality in regional 
output. 
 
      2.2 Education  
Human capital is a well known determinant of growth and development. Education is 
also a main determinant of cultural traits. Since our goal is to study the direct link 
between culture and economic development, we want to avoid using culture just as a 
proxy for human capital in the region. Thus, we always control for regional differences in 
the education of the adult population, measured by enrolment in primary and secondary 
schools in percent of the population of the relevant age group. Both per capita output and 
culture are measured in the late 1990s. Much of the adult population in this period went 
to school in the 1960s and 1970s. An early date minimizes the risk of reverse causation; 
we thus collected data on school enrolment in 1960. This variable is called school.  There 
is no unique European source of regional data for such an early period, and we had to rely 
on disparate national sources (see the data appendix). Note that primary school was 
already compulsory in most if not all European regions in 1960; hence, most of the 
regional variation in this variable comes from secondary school enrolment.   
 
      2.3 Urbanization 
As discussed below, my identification strategy hinges on the assumption that the 
historical variables used as instruments for culture are uncorrelated with unobserved 
determinants of current economic performance. The risk of invalid instruments would be 
reduced if the second stage regression also controlled for regional economic development 
at about the same point in time as the historical instruments for culture. This would make 
it more likely that the historical instruments influence current economic performance 
only through culture rather than, say, through a slow process of economic convergence.    8
Unfortunately, regional data on per capita output do not go back enough in time.  As a 
proxy for regional economic development in previous centuries, I use past urbanization 
rates. In the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, cities were the center of commerce; the 
industrial revolution further concentrated economic activities around major urban areas. 
For this reason, several previous studies rely on city size as a measure of past economic 
development (eg. De Long and Shleifer 1993, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinsion 2002). 
To measure past urbanization rates, I constructed the variable urb_rate1850, defined as 
the fraction of regional population that lived in cities with more than 30 000 individuals 
around 1850. City size is measured in 1850, and the source is Bairoch, Batou and Chèvre 
(????).  Regional population is measured in 1860, and drawn from several sources listed 
in the appendix. The threshold of 30 000 individuals is chosen to maximize the 
correlation between past urbanization and regional per capita output today.  The year 
1850 is chosen because it is closest to my earliest data on regional population, namely 
1860. But the results are similar if using lower thresholds for city size, or if city size is 
measured at earlier points in time (like 1700 or 1750 or 1800) but still scaled to regional 
population in 1860.  The pattern of this variable is displayed in Figure ?? 
 
2.4 Culture 
The measures of culture are obtained from the World Value Surveys – Inglehart et al. 
(2000). These are opinion polls designed to enable a cross national comparison of values 
and norms on a wide range of topics. I exploit two waves, one carried out in 1990-91, the 
other in 1995-97.  The number of individuals polled varies considerably across regions. 
On average, there are about 320 individuals polled in each region. But the number polled 
in the Spanish regions is much higher than in the rest of the sample (over 2000 
individuals in some regions), while in a few regions we have as little as 50 or 60 
individuals.  The median number of individuals polled in each region is about 130.   To 
cope with these disparities, in some of the regression analysis below I also weigh our 
regional measures of beliefs with the size of the cell corresponding to each region or with 
other measures of the dispersion of beliefs within each region.    
  The World Value Surveys are designed to measure a variety of cultural traits. 
Which are more favorable to growth and economic development?  Drawing on a large 
sociological literature that addresses this issue, I focus on four cultural features for which 
I could find measurable counterparts.
7  Three of them are expected to encourage a 
                                                 
7 Platteau (2000) provides an excellent review of the relevant literature.    9
positive and productive attitude towards market exchange, entrepreneurial activities, or 
the production of public goods. They are thus cultural features that favor economic 
development. The fourth indicator is symptomatic of a more hierarchical society where 
individuals are less likely to take advantage of economic opportunities or to cooperate 
with each other, and thus can act as a drag on development.  
The first and most obvious positive cultural feature, stressed in several other 
studies, is trust. In prisoner’s dilemma type of situation, interactions between trusting 
individuals are more likely to lead to efficient outcomes, whereas lack of trust makes it 
more difficult to overcome the inefficient equilibrium. For this reason, trust facilitates the 
extension of anonymous market exchange and reduces the need for external enforcement 
of contractual agreements (see for instance Dixit 2004). Lack of trust, on the other hand, 
is associated with suspicion and fear of fraud. This raises the cost of transactions outside 
of the local community and thus reduces the benefit of division of labor and the gains 
from trade.  
To measure trust we consider the following question in the survey: “ Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful 
in dealing with people?”.  The level of trust in each region is measured by the percentage 
of respondents who answer that “Most people can be trusted” (the other possible answers 
are “Can’t be too careful” and “Don’t know”). This variable is called trust.   
A second cultural feature often mentioned as a driver of economic development is 
the conviction that individual effort is likely to pay off.  If individuals are highly 
motivated to succeed and view economic success as related to their deliberate choices, 
they are more likely to work hard, to invest for the future, to innovate and undertake new 
economic initiatives. Conversely, if individuals regard success as due to luck or to 
uncontrollable external events, they are more likely to have a passive, resigned and lazy 
attitude towards economic activity.  In his classic case study of life in Chiaromonte, a 
rural village in Southern Italy, Banfield (1958) was struck by the resignation and the 
helplessness of these peasants, and how this contrasted with the determination and the 
initiative of rural communities in the US. These opposite attitudes towards the perceived 
consequences of effort and initiative are bound to have a big impact on aggregate 
economic performance in the long run.  
To measure this cultural trait we construct a variable, called control, from the 
following question in the survey: “ Some people feel they have completely free choice 
and control over their lives, while other people feel that what we do has no real effect on   10
what happens to them.  Please use this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means “none at all” 
and  10 means “a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control in life 
you have over the way your life turns out”.  The variable control is defined as the 
unconditional average response in each region (multiplied by 10). 
A third important cultural trait, stressed in particular by Platteau (2000), relates to 
the distinction between generalized vs limited morality. In hierarchical societies, codes of 
good conduct and honest behavior are often confined to small circles of related people 
(members of the family, or of the clan).  Outside of this small network, opportunistic and 
highly selfish behaviour is regarded as natural and morally acceptable. This contrasts 
with modern democratic societies, where abstract rules of good conduct apply to many 
social situations, and not just in a small network of personal friends and relatives. As 
argued by Weber (1970) and many others, the emancipation of the individual from feudal 
arrangements has typically been associated with a diffusion of generalized morality. But 
the distinction between generalized vs limited morality remains relevant today, to 
understand cultural differences between different parts of modern Europe. Banfield 
(1958) builds his analysis of life in Chiaromonte on what he calls “amoral familism”, 
namely the application of the principles of good and evil inside the family only. 
According to Banfied, moral principles are regarded as irrelevant by residents of 
Chiaromonte when they deal with non-family members. “Amoral familism” is the other 
side of trust. With trust we measure the belief that others can be trusted. An “amoral 
familist” is intrinsically not trustworthy. The two cultural traits are thus related and have 
similar economic implications.  
The distinction between generalized vs limited morality has other relevant 
implications, however. Individuals who practice generalized (as opposed to limited) 
morality are more reluctant to free ride on others. This matters not only for the economic 
behaviour of individuals (eg., cheating on taxes or on your boss), but also for their 
participation in group activities and for the behaviour of politicians and public officials. 
As stressed by Putnam (1999) and Banfield (1958), the participation of individuals in the 
political and administrative life of their local communities is key to organize the 
provision of local public goods and to monitor political representatives or local 
administrators. If individuals lack respect for other members of their community and for 
the “res publica”, public good provision is bound to be inadequate, and public 
administrators are likely to engage in nepotism or outright corruption. This too acts as a 
drag on economic development.   11
To measure the relative importance of generalized vs limited morality, we 
consider the values transmitted from parents to children, and in particular the value 
attached to respect for other people. Specifically, we consider the following question: 
“Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if 
any, do you consider to be especially important?  Please choose up to five”. The variable 
respect is defined as the percentage of respondents in each region that has mentioned the 
quality “tolerance and respect for other people” as being important (the other qualities in 
the list are: “good manners; independence; obedience; hard work; feeling of 
responsibility; imagination; thrift, saving money and things; determination and 
perseverance; religious faith; unselfisheness”). 
    Lack of trust, lack of respect for others, lack of confidence in the ability to 
improve one’s situation, are distinct cultural traits. Nevertheless, they are all typical of 
hierarchical societies where the individual is regarded as responding to instinct rather 
than reason, and where instinct often leads to a myopic or harmful course of action. In 
such societies, individualism is mistrusted and to be suppressed, since nothing good can 
come out of it: good behavior is deemed to result from coercion, not from internalization 
of the values of society. Hence, the role of the state is to force citizens to behave well. 
Likewise, the role of parental education is to control the negative instincts of children, 
often through recourse to violence – cf. Banfield (1958). Of course, such coercive 
cultural environments stifle individual initiative and cooperation within a group, and can 
hurt growth and development. To capture this cultural feature, distrustful of the benefits 
of individualism, I consider again the question on the virtues of children mentioned 
above. The variable obedience is defined as the percentage of respondents that mention 
“obedience” as an important quality that children should be encouraged to learn.
8 
We thus have four related but distinct measures of culture: three indicators 
expected to promote economic development (trust, control, respect), and one that might 
hurt it (obedience). In the analysis below I consider each of these variables in isolation. 
But to come up with a single measure of culture, I have also extracted the first principal 
component of these four variables, from the whole data set with all individual responses, 
based on the correlation matrix. The regional average of this principal component, called 
                                                 
8 Researchers in psychology and sociology that compare cultural traits of different societies have suggested 
similar ideas. Schwartz (1999) and Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2004), in particular, stress the 
relevance of a cultural feature related to our variable obedience. They refer to it as the contrast between 
hierarchy and egalitarianism, where hierarchy corresponds to “ a cultural emphasis on oberying role 
obligations within a legitimately unequal distribution of power, roles and resources” - Licht, Goldschmidt 
and Schwartz (2004).   12
pc_culture,  is a summary measure of these cultural beliefs. Since this principal 
component is negatively correlated with obedience, while it is positively correlated with 
trust, control and respect, we take it to be a net measure of the aspects of regional culture 
that favour economic development. To facilitate the interpretation, we have also extracted 
the first principal component from the positive beliefs only (trust, control and respect), 
called  pc_culture_pos, as well as the first principal component from the two questions on 
the desirable qualities of children (obedience and respect), called pc_children.  Since this 
variable is positively correlated with respect and negatively correlated with obedience, it 
is once more a net measure of the aspects of norms that favour economic development. 
To interpret these indicators as percentages, all principal components have been 
multiplied by 100. Finally, since the principal component only captures the variation that 
is common to all beliefs, while these norms could have more than one relevant dimension 
of variation, I have also computed an alternative summary measure called sum_culture, 
defined as the sum of the three positive beliefs (trust, control, respect) minus the negative 
belief (obedience).  
 Table 1 displays the correlation between the four original cultural attributes and 
the summary measures of culture on the whole sample of over 20000 individual. Note 
that, even though the four cultural attributes are not mutually correlated among 
individuals (see the last three columns of the table), all four summary measures are quite 
correlated among themselves (see the cells in the upper left part of the correlation 
matrix). Moreover, the individual cultural attributes are closely correlated with the 
corresponding principal component (except when, by construction, they have been 
omitted in the computation of the principal component). This suggests that, while there is 
a lot of noise in the individual responses, these summary measures do capture a common 
cultural pattern.  Finally, note that the first principal component of all four cultural traits 
(the variable pc_culture) is almost perfectly correlated with their algebraic sum, 
sum_culture = trust + control + respect – obedience. This suggests that these four 
measures of culture enter the first principal component with approximately equal weights. 
The regional averages of these indicators of culture conceal very large variation 
amongst individuals within each region. Figure 2a illustrates the distribution of the 
variable pc_culture (based on individual responses) in Italy and in two Italian regions, 
one in the North and one in the South (Lombardy and Campania).  The regional 
distributions are clearly different, but the range of variation within each region remains 
large. In the overall sample of individual responses, regional dummy variables only   13
explain about 6% of the variance of the variable pc_culture (country dummy variables 
explain about 3.5%).
9 Thus the regional average is likely to be an imperfect measure of 
regional culture. The concern about measurement error is compounded by the fact that, 
given the small number of respondents in some of the regions, these opinion polls are 
unlikely to be based on a representative sample of the regional population. To cope with 
this problem, besides taking the unconditional averages described above, we have also 
computed the regional average after controlling for other observable features of the 
individual respondent. Specifically, in the comprehensive dataset of individual responses, 
we have regressed each of the cultural variables described above on a vector of regional 
dummy variables, as well as on the following additional individual controls: a dummy 
variable for being married, a dummy variable for being male, the age group, and a self 
reported social class.
10  Our regional measures of conditional beliefs are taken to be the 
estimated coefficients on the regional dummy variables. In some regressions below, we 
also weight regional observations with the standard errors of these estimated coefficients, 
or with the size of the cells of respondents polled in each region, to allow for different 
measurement errors across regions.  
The unconditional beliefs in each region and their summary measures are listed in 
Table 2. Figure 2b illustrates the regional pattern in the first principal component of 
culture,  pc_culture. Higher values correspond to cultural features expected to be 
favourable to economic development. Again, data are displayed in equal intervals, but the 
continuous measures are used in the analysis. The regional pattern of culture in Figure 2b 
is strikingly similar to that of per capita output in Figure 1. In particular, Germany, 
England and Northern Italy tend to have high per capita output and more positive cultural 
indicators, while Southern Italy, Portugal and Southern Spain fare worse on both counts. 
But the correlation is not perfect. In particular, France is rich but its cultural traits are a 
priori less favourable to economic development.   
    
  2.5  Output and Culture   
Some of the correlation between per capita output and culture apparent from Figures 1 
and 2 can simply reflect the influence of other common determinants, such as education, 
historical levels of economic development or national institutions. To remove the effect 
                                                 
9 The estimate coefficients of these regional dummy variables are often statistically different from zero 
(some are positive and some are negative). 
10 An indicator of the size of the town of residence turned out to be statistically insignificant and was not 
used as a regressor in the final specification.   14
of these other variables, we have regressed per capita output (yp9500) on a set of dummy 
variables (one per country), school enrolment in 1960 (school), urbanization rates in 1850 
(urb_rate1850) and the various measures of culture. The estimated coefficients of school, 
past urbanization and culture are displayed in Table 3 (unweigthed observations) and 
Table 4 (observations are weighted by the numbers of individuals polled in each region). 
Each row reports two standard errors: those estimated by OLS (above), and clustered 
standard errors (below), that allow for arbitrary patterns of correlation within countries 
but assume independence across countries. The tables confirm the visual impression from 
Figures 1 and 2: there is a strong and significant correlation between all measures of 
culture and current development, after controlling for country fixed effects and for school 
enrolment in 1960. The sign of the estimated coefficients also conforms to prior 
expectations. These estimated coefficients are not only statistically significant, but also 
economically relevant. Consider for instance the first principal component of all four 
measures of culture, pc_culture.  The difference in the value of this variable between say 
Lombardy and a typical region in Southern Italy is about 50. The estimated coefficient in 
Table 3 of 0.58 implies that this cultural difference is predicted to be associated with a 
difference in GDP per capita of about one third of the EU average (namely almost half of 
the observed income difference between Lombardy and Southern Italy).  Very similar 
results are obtained if beliefs are measured by their conditional counterparts (ie the 
residuals of beliefs after controlling for some individual features of the respondent – see 
the discussion above). The estimated coefficient of school enrolment also has the 
expected (positive) sign, although it is not always statistically significant, while that of 
past the urbanization rate is always positive and highly significant, to signal strong 
persistence in economic development. 
Finally, the left hand side panel of Figure 3 displays the estimated residuals of 
yp9500 (on the vertical axis) and of pc_culture (on the horizontal axis), estimated from a 
regressions against the remaining control variables in Table 3 (namely the variables 
school   and urb_1850 plus the country fixed effects). A strong and robust positive 
correlation is evident. The slope of the line going through the scatter plots corresponds to 
the estimated coefficient displayed in column 5 of Table 3.  Figure 3 thus confirms that 
the positive correlation between output and culture is not due to any outlier observations.  
The right hand side panel of Figure 3 shows that the correlation between culture and 
output is not just due to Italy: even if all Italian regions are excluded from the sample, a 
positive correlation remains and the estimated coefficient of culture is statistically   15
significant at the 5% level in the OLS regression. But the correlation is weaker without 
Italy, since differences in economic development and in culture are much less 
pronounced within the other European countries.   
Naturally, we cannot safely assume that culture is independent of current levels of 
economic development. On the contrary, all our variables measuring culture are likely to 
be influenced by the current economic situation.  Controlling for current education in 
each region (the variable school) and for past economic development as measured by past 
urbanization rates (the variable urb_rate1850) removes some of this correlation. And 
considering conditional beliefs (ie. the residual component of regional beliefs after 
controlling for some features of the respondent such as his self – reported social class) 
can remove other sources of reverse causation from output to culture. Nevertheless, 
reverse causation remains a fundamental concern.  Hence, the estimated coefficients 
reported in Tables 3 and 4 could be biased and cannot be interpreted as reflecting a causal 
effect of culture on output.  To cope with this problem, in the remainder of the paper I 
rely on instrumental variable estimation, using other historical variables as instruments 
for culture. But before turning to that, I further discuss the properties of these indicators 
of culture.  
 
2.6 Output, culture and institutional outcomes in a sample of countries 
How do these cultural indicators relate to the measures of institutions widely used in 
existing cross-country analysis?  And do they explain cross country differences in per-
capita income? Before turning to the historical analysis, I address this question. A recent 
wave of the World Value surveys, conducted in 1999-2000 and covering a larger sample 
of countries, has just been made available. From this third wave, I constructed the same 
indicators of culture at the country (rather than regional) level, for almost 50 countries.  
Table  5 reports alternative cross-country regressions, with some of the same 
variables used in the literature, namely the log of per capita output in 1988 (logyl) and a 
measure of protection of property rights between 1986 and 1995 (gadp). These variables 
are those used by Hall and Jones (1999). All correlations are remarkably strong, 
confirming that indeed these variables do measure cultural traits that vary systematic with 
economic development and with available measures of institutional outcomes.  
Column 1 and 2 report a simple OLS regression of the log of output per worker 
(logyl) and of institutional outcomes protecting property rights (gadp) against the first 
principal component of culture (pc_culture). The estimated coefficient of pc_culture is   16
positive and highly significant, as expected, and it is even higher than in the OLS 
regression in the sample of European regions (cf. Table 4).  Based on these estimates, 
variation in culture between Sweden and Uganda (the countries with the highest and 
lowest values for pc_culture respectively) can explain over two thirds of the difference in 
output per worker, and almost all of the difference in institutional outcomes, between 
these two countries.  
Columns 3-5 attempt to remove bias due to reverse causation or omitted variables, 
by using religion as an instrument for culture. Column 3 displays the first stage, where 
pc_culture is regressed on the percentage of the population professing protestant religion 
in 1980 (protestant).
11  Protestant religion helps to explain the positive attributes of 
culture. As shown in columns 4 and 5, the second stage estimates confirm a positive and 
highly significant effect of culture on both output and institutional outcomes. 
Finally, columns 6-8 repeat the instrumental variable estimation, but using 
colonial origin (measured by the celebrated log of settler’s mortality, Log-mortality) as an 
instrument for culture. Here data are available for only 20 countries. Yet, the results 
remain remarkably robust. Higher mortality (i.e. worse colonial origin) leads to worse 
cultural traits in the first stage regression (column 6). And culture has an even stronger 
and significant effect on both output and institutional outcomes.  
Even without suggesting a causal interpretation, these regressions are nevertheless 
remarkable. They show that these cultural indicators are meaningful, and highly 
correlated with  variables that have attracted so much interest in the recent analysis of 
cross country differences in economic development. They also suggest that institutions 
and culture are likely to interact to determine economic development.  But separating the 
effect of culture from that of institutions is more credibly done in the sample of European 
regions, where one can control for common political and economic institutions at the 
national level, and where unobserved heterogeneity is less problematic.  This is what I do 
in the remainder of the paper.  
 
     3. Historical data 
A valid instrument for culture in the output regressions should satisfy two requirements. 
First, it should be correlated with culture. Second, it should not be correlated with output, 
after controlling for culture and for the other regressors in the output equation (country 
fixed effects, contemporaneous education and past urbanization). In other words, a valid 
                                                 
11 The source for this variable is LaPorta et al. (1998).   17
instrument should be correlated with output exclusively through culture.  This section 
describes two historical variables used as instruments for culture: regional literacy rates at 
the end of the XIX century, and regional political institutions between the XVIIth and the 
XIXth century. Our identifying assumptions are discussed in the next section. 
 
   3.1 Literacy in 1880 
Individual values and beliefs are likely to reflect much more than the education received 
in school by the current generation. Culture is also transmitted from one generation to the 
next inside the family, and through social interactions in the local community. Regions 
that were poorly educated several decades ago are likely to have different cultural traits 
from regions with a longer tradition of solid and widespread education.  
To capture regional differences in educational histories, I collected data on the 
literacy rate around 1880 by region. This variable, called literacy, is compiled from a 
variety of sources, described more in detail in the data appendix. The precise definition of 
literacy varies slightly across countries.
12 For almost all countries, I could find data on 
literacy at the regional level. The exceptions are the Netherlands and Portugal, where I 
could only find national data (so that all regions in these countries are assigned the same 
literacy rate).  
The data on literacy are illustrated in Figure 4 (again with data divided in octiles).  
This variable is likely to be positively correlated with per capita output around the turn of 
the century, but certainly it measures more than just per capita output. For instance, 
Germany pursued a deliberate policy of widespread education and has the highest literacy 
rates in our sample, but its per capita income around 1880 was below that of France, and 
much lower (less than 2/3) than that of the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands. Once more, 
Italy stands out as having large regional differences.  
 
   3.2 Early political institutions 
As noted in the introduction, a remarkable feature of European history is that regions now 
belonging to the same country were ruled by very different political institutions in the 
distant past. It is very likely that these different institutions left a mark on regional 
culture. Consider an autocratic and corrupt regime that survives thanks to a strong 
                                                 
12 Literacy is generally defined as the ability to read or write. In some cases the source is the census of the 
overall population, in other cases literacy rates refer to military recruits, yet in other cases they refer to 
marriages. The data are thus not always strictly comparable and are certainly measured with error. But, as 
shown in Figure 2, these measurement problems are likely to be swamped by the large variation of the 
variable literacy across regions.    18
hierarchy of privileges and that subjugates the population with the arbitrary use of force. 
Such an environment will foster cultural traits that hurt economic development: mistrust 
of unfamiliar people, limited as opposed to general morality, a sense of individual 
helplessness and resignation. The effect on culture will be opposite in a republican 
regime where productive entrepreneurs or traders participate openly in the political 
organization of society, the rule of law is respected, supreme authority is constrained by 
checks and balances (Putnam 1993, chp. 5).  Indeed, several authors have emphasized 
that the historical evolution of political liberalism, in practice and as a doctrine, goes 
hand in hand with the diffusion of generalized morality. A well functioning republican 
institution reinforces positive cultural values, by providing role models and by showing 
that positive beliefs match reality and are associated with good outcomes (Platteau 
2000).
13  
To capture the different political histories of the regions in our sample, we 
constructed a summary measure of their early political institutions. To do this, we had to 
solve various problems and take several decisions. 
A first question is which feature of political institutions to focus on. We followed 
some of the existing literature, and coded political institutions by the variable Constraints 
on the Executive, as defined in the data set POLITY IV – cf. Eckstein, H. and T. Gurr 
1975. Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry, Wiley Interscience. 
This variable is designed to capture “institutionalised constraints on the decision making 
powers of chief executives”. According to this criterion, better political institutions have 
one or both features: the holder of executive powers is accountable to bodies of political 
representatives or to citizens; and/or government authority is constrained by checks and 
balances and by the rule of law. As in POLITY IV, the variable “Constraints on the 
Executive” varies from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (accountable executive, constrained 
by checks and balances). Higher values thus correspond to better institutions. The 
historical appendix provides more information about the coding of this variable.  
  A second question is over which time period to measure political institutions. 
Following Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), we coded regional institutions in a 
40 year window around five dates: 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850. After this last date, 
the European countries in our sample were unified approximately along current borders, 
and we lose any relevant variation in political institutions within countries.  
                                                 
13 DeLong and Shleifer (1993) relate city growth in Western Europe between 1000 and 1880 to national 
political institutions over that period, and conclude that absolutist monarchic regimes stifled growth of 
commerce and industry.   19
  A third question is how to code the variable “Constraints on the Executive” at 
each of these dates, and based on which sources. Where the relevant political entity is the 
country with approximately current borders, and there is little or no regional autonomy, 
we assign to all regions in the country the same value as to the country itself.  We 
obtained this number from the source POLITY IV from 1800 onwards, and from 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) for the period 1600-1750.  This takes care of 
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal and most of Spain and of the UK.  In all these 
countries with the exception of Spain and the UK, either the central level of government 
had considerable authority over the whole territory, or, to the extent that regional or local 
governments had important prerogatives, there was not much variation in the checks and 
balances on these local governments compared to those at the center.  
There are two exceptions to this rule. One is Northern Ireland in the UK, that we 
code as having had the same institutions as Ireland (our source for Ireland is Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson 2002). The second exception are the Spanish regions of Aragon, 
Catalonia and Valencia. These regions integrated in the Spanish Crown maintaining for a 
period their own Parliaments, the “Cortes”, as guarantors of local freedoms and 
prerogatives. We thus give them a higher (more democratic) score in 1600 and 1700 
compared to the rest of Spain – see the historical appendix for more detailed information. 
  In the case of  Italy and Germany, a unitary state was formed only after 1850. We 
thus had to track down the complex political history of the Italian regions and of the 
German Landers (or of smaller territorial entities inside each lander). The historical 
appendix briefly summarizes the history of these regions, the specific decisions we made, 
and our mains sources.  
The variables corresponding to all five dates, 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850, 
are listed in Table 6 (institution_1600 etc...) A general trend towards stronger checks and 
balances in the more recent period is evident. But the trend does not cover all regions. In 
particular, several Italian regions experienced a worsening of their institutions during the 
Napoleonic period (around 1800) and the Austrian rule (around 1850). This raises one 
last problem: how to aggregate these five historical variables in a single measure of 
political history for each region. Taking a snapshot at a single point in time would be 
incorrect, since the measure would vary depending on the date selected. We thus 
aggregate the five measures of political institutions into a single variable defined as the 
first principal component of the five variables measuring constraints on the executive at 
the five different points in time, and we call this new variable pc_institutions – also listed   20
in Table 6. But to check the robustness, we also report results for a simple average of the 
five historical variables (institutions_average), as well as for a weighted average 
(institutions_weighted) where more recent dates receive a higher weight, to account for 
the possibility that the influence of past institutions fades with.
14 
Figure 5 illustrates our political map of the European regions around 1700. Not 
much variation in institutions is apparent at this time. But the UK, the Netherlands and 
the republics of Venice and Genova stand out as having better institutions, with Southern 
Spain, some regions in central Italy and in Germany, Belgium and Portugal having 
intermediate values. Figure 6 illustrates the geographic pattern of the first principal 
component of political institutions (pc_institutions). Now more variation is evident, also 
within countries. The Netherlands, the German city states in the North, some regions in 
Northern Italy continue to display better institutions, while Central and Southern Italy, 
much of Germany and of Spain fare worse.  
Note that the geographic pattern of literacy and pc_institutions bear some 
resemblance, but there are also significant differences (cf. Figures 4 and 6). For instance, 
Germany has very high literacy rates, but rather bad political institutions. This is 
confirmed by the fact that the partial correlation coefficient between these two variables 
expressed in deviation from country means is 0.34, positive but very far from perfect 
correlation – cf. Table 7.  Thus, these two historical variables do capture different (albeit 
related) features of the history of the regions in our sample.  Table 7 also reports the full 
matrix of partial correlation coefficients between most of the variables described up to 
this point, always expressed in deviations from country means. The historical variables 
are strongly correlated with our measures of culture, as well as with regional per capita 




4. Estimation strategy 
Our ultimate goal is to estimate the causal effect of culture on output, in a linear 
regression like: 
 
(1)           Y = αo +βo X + δo C + e 
                                                 
14 Specifically, the precise definition of the weighted average is: institutions_weighted = 
(0.5*institutions_1600 + 0.7*institutions_1700+0.8*institutions_1750+0.9*institutions_1800+  
+institutions_1850)/(0.5+0.7+0.8+0.9+1) 
   21
 
where Y denotes regional per capita output, C is an indicator of culture, X denotes other 
regressors ( such as country dummy variables, contemporaneous education and past 
urbanization), e is an unobserved error term, and δo is the coefficient of interest.  The 
problem is that culture and the unobserved error term in (1) are likely to be correlated.  
We thus posit that the stochastic process for culture is given by: 
 
(2)          C = α1 +β1 X + λ1 Literacy + λ2 Institutions + v 
 
where Literacy and Institutions are the two historical variables described in the previous 
section, and v is an unobserved error term capturing all other determinants of culture 
(possibly also including a reverse feedback effect from income to culture). Treating 
Literacy and Institutions as instruments for culture in the output regression, we isolate the 
variation in culture that is exogenous (i.e. due to the historical variables) and neglect the 
possibly endogenous variation in culture due to the unobserved error term v. The 
instrumental variable estimate of the parameter of interest in the output regression, δo , 
only exploits this exogenous variation in culture. Thus, we no longer have to worry that 
culture is endogenous to output, or that both output and culture could proxy for some 
relevant omitted variable, or even that our indicators of culture are measured with error. 
The critical issue has been shifted away from whether culture is endogenous or measured 
accurately, to whether our historical variables are valid instruments.  
  The identifying assumption for the validity of our instruments is that the variables 
Literacy and Institutions are uncorrelated with the error term e in the output regression. 
Note that the regressors in X include a  measure of contemporaneous education of the 
regional population, country dummy variables and past urbanization rates. Thus, our 
identifying assumptions can also be interpreted as follows: the literacy rate five or six 
generations ago does not directly influence current output, after controlling for the 
education and culture of the currently adult population, urbanization rates in 1850 and 
national institutions; and the political institutions of several centuries ago do not directly 
influence current regional output, after controlling for national institutions and the 
regressors listed above.  
  One or both assumptions could thus be violated, if the historical differences 
between regions captured by our instruments had a direct economic impact on the region 
(other than through culture). For instance, the assumption that literacy is a valid   22
instrument for culture could be violated if past literacy rates also had a lasting effect on, 
say, the sectoral composition of current employment, and this in turn affects regional per 
capita despite controlling for past urbanization rates. To cope with this possibility, in 
section 5 we also discuss what happens when including the sectoral composition of 
employment among  the regressors.  Likewise, the assumption that political history is a 
valid instrument could be violated if politically more backward regimes created smaller 
endowments of public infrastructures (eg. roads or railways), and almost two centuries of 
unification and of public investments in the poor regions were not sufficient to remedy 
this initial deficiency.    
  Admittedly, the identifying assumptions are strong. This is likely to apply to 
almost any instrumental variable one can think of in this context: most variables that 
influence culture could also have a direct effect on per capita output. Nevertheless, with 
two instruments for just one endogenous variable, the model is over-identified and we 
can test the over-identifying restrictions. This means that, if at least one of the two 
instruments is valid, we can test for the validity of the other instrument.  Essentially, this 
amounts to asking whether the instrumental variable estimates vary significantly 
depending on whether we use only one instrument, and which one, or both instruments.  
In section 6 we discuss more extensively the power of this test. 
        
5. Estimating the effect of culture on income 
 
5.1 Reduced form estimates 
We start by estimating the reduced form linking current economic development to both 
historical variables and to the other exogenous regressors. If past literacy rates and 
political history are correlated with culture, which in turn influences per capita output, we 
ought to find a significant effect of both historical variables on per capita output, after 
controlling for the other regressors.  
As shown in Table 8, this is indeed what we find. The dependent variable is 
regional per capita output (yp9500) and country dummy variables are always included. 
Thus, the estimates displayed in Table 8 only reflect within country variations. As before, 
regular and clustered standard errors are estimated. School enrolment in 1960 (school) 
has the expected positive coefficient, although it is statistically significant only with 
respect to the clustered standard errors. Urbanization in 1850 (urb_rate1850) has a 
positive estimated coefficient, always significant with OLS estimation. The literacy rate 
in 1880 (literacy) always has a positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient,   23
for all specifications. The alternative measures of political institutions also have the 
expected sign, always significant with OLS estimation, but less precisely estimated when 
observations are allowed to be clustered within countries.  
Both  literacy and yp9500 are expressed in percentage points.  The estimated 
coefficient in literacy thus says that a 1% increase in the literacy rate at the end of the 
1800s is associated with  a 0.8%-0.9% increase in current per capita output relative to the 
EU average. Given the large differences in literacy rates among European regions at the 
end of the 1800s, these are very big effects. The effect of past political institutions is less 
precisely estimated, but it is also quantitatively relevant. The difference in past political 
institutions between, say, Southern Italy and Lombardy, as measured by the variable 
pc_institutions, is about 1.7. According to the estimated coefficient of  pc_institutions in 
column 3, therefore, if Southern Italy had had the same political institutions as 
Lombardy, its current income would now be higher by about 17%. This is a smaller 
effect compared to that of the variable literacy, but economically relevant.  
 
5.2 Instrumental variable estimates 
Next, we estimate the effect of culture on per capita output, using literacy and political 
history as instruments for culture. Table 9 reports the first and second stage regressions, 
for different summary measures of culture and of political institutions, with regular and 
clustered standard errors. In both stages we always control for country dummy variables, 
school enrolment and past urbanization. The last row reports the p-value of Sargan’s chi-
square statistics for the over-identification test.
15 The two historical instruments are 
strongly correlated with cultural indicators, for all measures of political institutions, with 
the expected sign. Bad political institutions and low literacy rates are associated with 
negative cultural traits (such as low trust, low respect for others, low feelings of 
controlling one’s life, and high appreciation for obedience in children), and the F 
statistics on the excluded instruments is around 13. The effect of culture on economic 
development is always large and statistically significant, again with the expected sign. 
Finally, the over-identification restrictions are never rejected.  
Note that urbanization in 1850 is strongly correlated with current regional output, but 
it does not explain culture (the estimated coefficient of urbanization in 1850 is practically 
zero in all first stage regressions). This supports the identifying assumption: 
                                                 
15 The Sargan statistics assumes homoscedastic residuals. But estimating with the robust option that allows 
for heteroscedastic residuals and testing the over-identifying restrictions with Hansen’s J statistic gives very 
similar results.     24
contemporaneous cultural traits do not just reflect economic development in previous 
centuries, but are explained by specific historical circumstances and in particular by the 
education of previous generations and by the political environment in which they lived.  
Comparing the estimated coefficients in Table 9 with the OLS estimates reported in 
Table 3, we see that projecting culture on the two historical variables actually increases 
their estimated coefficient. In other words, the cross-regional variation in culture that can 
be attributed to history is more strongly correlated with development compared to the 
overall measures of culture. Attenuation bias due to measurement error in our indicators 
of culture could explain why instrumental variables yields higher estimated coefficients 
compared to the OLS regressions.
16 
Table 10 repeats the same exercise for the individual measures of culture, always 
using the same indicator of political institutions, pc_institutions (but the results are 
similar for other measures of political institutions). All cultural variables have a large and 
significant estimated coefficient in the second stage regressions, always with the expected 
sign. In the first stage regressions one of the historical instruments is always significant, 
though not always the same one depending on the measure of culture. Note also that the 
orthogonality test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions, except when culture is 
measured by the variable respect.  Comparing the estimates in Tables 9 and 10, a possible 
interpretation is that the individual measures of beliefs used in Table 10 capture an 
incomplete dimension of culture, and thus are imperfectly correlated with the historical 
variables. When a more comprehensive indicator of culture is used (through simple 
averages  or by extracting the first principal component), the correlations are stronger and 
more robust and the over-identification assumptions seem more consistent with the data.  
So far we have measured culture by unconditional beliefs, and we did not weigh 
observations for the size of the regional cell from which individual beliefs are averaged. 
Table 11 reports the instrumental variables estimates for conditional measures of culture, 
weighting observations by the standard errors of the regional averages –see section 2 for 
a precise definition of conditional beliefs. The results are very similar to those of Table 9 
and always convey the same message: culture is explained by the historical instruments; 
culture in turn explains current economic development; and we cannot reject the over-
                                                 
16 The finding that IV estimates are larger in absolute value than OLS estimates is quite common in the 
literature on cross country comparisons. Besides measurement error, a less benign reason could be 
“heterogeneous treatment effect” (in our case, heterogeneity in the true coefficient of culture in the second 
stage regression). As pointed out by Heckman (1997), if the heterogeneity in the treatment effect is 
correlated with the instrument, then IV estimates are inconsistent even with valid instruments (i.e., even if 
the instruments are orthogonal to the second stage residual in the absence of heterogeneity).    25
identifying restriction that the historical variables influence development only through 
culture.  
 
5.3 Growth and culture  
Up to this point, we have studied the effect of culture on the level of per capita output 
observed today, taking culture to be a long run determinant of labor productivity and per 
capita output. But if culture influences per capita output in the long run, one should also 
see its effect on growth in the short run.   
Once more, this prior is born out by the data. Table 12 reports the estimates of a 
set of instrumental variables regressions where the dependent variable is average yearly 
growth of per capita output between 1977 and 2001 expressed in percentage points 
(comparable data on per capita output before the mid 1970s are not available for a large 
sample of regions). To allow for convergence, initial per capita output (in logs) is 
included among the regressors and treated as an exogenous variable.  The specification is 
otherwise the same as in the previous tables, with unconditional beliefs as measures of 
culture.   
Column (1) of Table 12 reports the first stage, where the variable pc_culture is 
regressed on the two historical instruments, on per capita output in 1977, urbanization in 
1850 and school (omitted to save space), plus the country dummy variables. The 
estimated coefficients of political institutions and literacy are very similar to those 
reported in the previous tables, with the estimated coefficient on political institutions 
highly significant, while that on literacy border-line significant (the F statistics for the 
joint significance of the instruments in the first stage regression takes a value of 9). The 
estimated coefficients of per capita output in 1977 and urbanization in 1850, instead, are 
not statistically significant. Although here we are treating per capita output as exogenous, 
this first stage regression is important, because it shows that the historical variables do 
not suffer from a weak instrument problem even when controlling for per-capita output in 
a not-too distant past.  
The remainder of Table 12 displays the second stage estimates, for alternative 
measures of culture (the first stage estimates are very similar to those in column 1, and 
the two historical variables are always significantly different from zero, irrespective of 
how we measure the dependent variable, culture). The estimated coefficients in columns 
(2)-(8) are consistent with some convergence (higher initial per capita output reduces   26
subsequent growth).
17 More importantly, all measures of culture influence growth, and 
the effect is always statistically significant and economically relevant.  According to the 
estimated coefficient, if Southern Italy had the same culture as Lombardy, its average 
yearly growth rate would have been higher by almost ½ %.
18   
 
5.4 Summary 
Summarising, all the instrumental variable estimates discussed so far portray a 
remarkably consistent and robust picture: first, past political institutions and low literacy 
rates left a mark on regional culture; second, this cultural legacy of history is an 
important determinant of current economic performance; third, the data cannot reject that 
past political institutions and literacy rates of previous generations influence economic 
performance only through culture.  
These inferences rest on a critical assumption, however: that at least one of the 
historical variables is a valid instrument for culture, after controlling for country fixed 
effects, past urbanization rates and contemporary education. The next section further 
discusses the validity of this assumption and the power of these orthogonality tests.  
 
6. How credible is the identification?  
As already anticipated in section 4, using past literacy rates as an instrument for culture 
gives rise to a concern. Could it be that regions with low literacy rates at the turn of the 
previous century specialised in agriculture, and this in turn explains their current low per 
capita output? To address this issue, I add the employment share in agriculture in 1977 
(agr_share) as an additional control variable to both the first and second stage 
equations.
19 The employment share in agriculture is negatively correlated with our 
measure of culture, pc_culture, with a partial correlation coefficient of about -0.4. I treat 
this new variable as exogenous and thus uncorrelated with both the first and second stage 
residuals. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 13 display the estimates. The estimated coefficient 
of the employment share in agriculture is significantly different from zero in the output 
                                                 
17 Given that growth is expressed in percentage points, the rate of convergence is about 1% per year, lower 
than found in other studies; but recall that our sample starts in 1977, and indeed others have found that 
regional convergence slowed down after the mid 1970s.  
18 In Table 11, initial per capita output is treated as exogenous while in fact it could be regarded as 
endogenous and correlated with the error term of the growth regression. In principle, with two instruments 
for culture, we could allow for two endogenous variables, culture and initial per capita output. But 
attempting to do this results in insignificant estimates for both culture and initial output. Evidently, there is 
not enough variation in our instruments to separately estimate the growth effect of initial output and culture 
when both are treated as endogenous.  
19 1977 is the first year in which we could find comparable regional data on this variable.    27
regression, but not in the equation for culture. All our previous inferences remain valid: 
the historical variables remain significant in the culture regression, and the size of the 
estimated coefficients barely changes. And culture remains a significant determinant of 
per capita output, although with a smaller estimated coefficient.
20 
The identifying assumptions on the validity of our instruments rule out any direct 
effect of the historical variables on output, after controlling for culture and for the other 
regressors. The orthogonality tests cannot reject this assumption, conditional on at least 
one of the two instruments being valid. As a further check, I add the two historical 
variables to the second stage regressions one at a time, treating the included variable as 
exogenous. Under these specifications, the model is just identified. If the instruments are 
valid, the estimated coefficients on these additional regressors ought to be close to zero, 
and the estimated coefficient in the variable pc_culture ought to remain stable under 
these alternative specifications. As shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 13, the estimated 
coefficient of these additional regressors are indeed not significantly different from zero, 
thus confirming the results of the Sargan statistics reported in the previous section as a 
test of the over-identifying restrictions.  Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient on the 
variable pc_culture does change across the two specifications, suggesting that the failure 
to reject the over-identifying restrictions is not completely water-proof. 
  Another important issue concerns the power of the orthogonality test for the over-
identifying restrictions. One specific question is whether the failure to reject reported in 
the previous sections might be due to specific features of our sample. To address this 
concern, I bootstrap the Sargan statistics, randomly replacing one observation from the 
sample with a random draw from a similar sample, and replicating the instrumental 
variable estimates 1000 times. The results are shown in Figure 7. In about 70% of the 
replications, the bootstrapped statistics does not reach the threshold of 3.84 that 
corresponds to a significance level of 5%. But in the remaining 30% of the time, the 
Sargan statistics exceed the critical value of 3.84. This exercise suggests that the failure 
to reject the over-identifying restrictions may not be very robust to special features of the 
sample; or, to put in other words, it suggests that the estimated p-value of the Sargan 
                                                 
20 If the sectoral composition of employment is correlated with the residual of the output equation, the 
estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 12 could be biased. Treating both culture and the sectoral 
composition of employment as endogenous, with the two historical variables as instruments, leads to 
inconclusive results. The partial correlation between our measure of culture and the employment share in 
agriculture is fairly high (0.4), and there is not enough variation in the two instruments to isolate the effects 
of both variables. As a result, the estimated coefficients of pc_culture and agr_share in the output 
regressions are not significantly different from zero when they are both treated as endogenous. This might 
also be due to a weak instrument problem: although the variable literacy is significantly correlated with the 
employment share in agriculture, the variable pc_institutions is not.    28
statistics reported in Table 9 is not significant at conventional levels, but it is nevertheless 
a bit low to be totally confident on the validity of the instruments.  
  A second more important question concerns the power of the Sargan statistics to 
reject the null hypothesis that both instruments are valid, when in fact one of them is not. 
To assess the power of this test, I ran a Montecarlo simulation.  The details are provided 
in Table 14. The data generating process (dgp) matches the observed moments of the 
data, and uses as true coefficients those obtained from Table 9, columns 1 and 2, except 
for the true coefficient of culture on output in the second stage regression.  This 
coefficient is set to 0.21 in the upper panel of Table 14, and to 0.86 in the lower panel of 
Table 14. These values correspond to 20% and 80% of the corresponding coefficient 
estimated in Table 9, respectively.  The dgp allows for measurement error in culture, and 
assumes that the system given by equations (1) and (2) above is recursive – i.e. it assumes 
no correlation between the error terms in the output and in the culture regressions 
(according to the estimated residuals, the system is almost recursive).  
I then consider four cases: (i) both historical variables are valid instruments for 
culture (i.e. they are both uncorrelated with the residuals of the output regression). This 
corresponds to the first row in the upper and lower panels of Table 14.  (ii), (iii) One of 
the two historical variables is a valid instrument for culture, the other is not (the 
correlation coefficient between the error term in the output equation and one of the two 
instruments is set to 0.4). These correspond to the second and third rows in the upper and 
lower panels of Table 14. (iv) No historical variable is a valid instrument (both are 
correlated with the residual of the output equation, with a correlation coefficient of 0.4).  
This corresponds to the last row in the two panels of Table 14.   
In cases (ii)-(iii), instrumental variables lead to biased estimates. Indeed, this is 
what we find. The bias, expressed as a percentage of the true coefficient, ranges from 
about 80% when the true coefficient is small (the upper panel of Table 14), to about 20% 
when the true coefficient is bigger (the lower panel of Table 14). In these two cases, the 
Sargan statistics should detect that one of the two instruments is not valid. It does so 
almost 70% of the time in the upper panel, where the bias is larger. But when the bias is 
smaller (because the true coefficient is larger), the Sargan statistics exceeds the critical 
value of 3.84 only about 60% of the time – cf. the lower panel. Moreover, the Sargan test 
finds it easier to reject (correctly) when literacy is a valid instrument, while invalidity of 
pc_institutions as an instrument is harder to detect.     29
Overall, these simulations are not too disturbing.  When the bias in the 
instrumental variable estimates is large, the Sargan statistics is not unreliable and rejects 
often when it should. Only if the bias is relatively small (about 20% of the true 
coefficient) do we see frequent failures to reject when instead one of the two instruments 
is not valid.  
Nevertheless, as illustrated in the last row of both panels in Table 14, the Sargan 
statistics almost never rejects when both instruments are not valid, despite a very large 
bias. This is no surprise, but it is an important reminder that, to be confident about the 
implications of the Sargan over-identification test, at least one of the two historical 
variables must be a valid instrument for culture.  
A special case of a violation of our assumptions that would not be detected by the 
Sargan statistics would occur if the true model was one in which history influences 
output, which in turn affects culture, with no direct effect of the historical variables on 
culture (exactly the reverse of the chain of causation postulated in our identification).  
This concern is made more serious by the fact that income and culture are measured at 
the same point in time. Unfortunately, measures of culture are not readily available for 
earlier time periods at a European level.  
Nevertheless, much of the relevant variation in history, culture and development 
comes from the Italian regions. And for Italy, I could find a variable that reflects cultural 
attitudes of earlier time periods. In 1946, Italy held a popular referendum in favour or 
against the monarchy. At the time, the monarchy was widely blamed for not preventing 
the dictatorial regime in the pre-war period. Hence, a vote in favour of the monarchy was 
likely to reflect backward cultural values, associated with mistrust of democratic 
institutions or nostalgia for the autocratic regime. As a measure of cultural backwardness 
in the immediate post-war period, I thus use the percentage of regional votes in favour of 
the monarchy at the 1946 referendum (this variable is called pro-monarchy). 
21 
As shown in Table 15, despite the very small number of observations (only 13), 
the patterns of vote in this referendum is strongly correlated both with the two historical 
instruments (the literacy rate and historical political institutions), and with 
contemporaneous measures of culture.   In columns 1-3, I regress pro-monarchy on the 
two historical variables, literacy and pc_institutions, both separately and jointly in the 
same regressions. When entered separately, both historical variables have a negative and 
significant estimated coefficient, although when entered jointly there is not enough 
                                                 
21 I am grateful to Andrea Ichino for suggesting the use of this variable and for making the data available.    30
variation in the data to provide significant estimates. Thus, as expected, historically more 
illiterate regions and regions with a worst political history, were more likely to vote in 
favour of the monarchy. In columns 4-5, votes in favour of the monarchy in 1946 are 
used to explain the contemporaneous measure of culture, pc-culture.  Again, there is a 
significant and negative relationship, both when estimated with OLS and when the two 
historical variables are used as instrument for pro-monarchy. Regions that voted in 
favour of the monarchy in 1946 have worse cultural attitudes today. Thus, not 
surprisingly, there is persistence in cultural traits. This evidence cannot dispel all doubts, 
given the small number of observations and the likely measurement error in the variable 
pro-monarchy as indicator of culture.  But it supports the view that history has an effect 
on culture, possibly independent from that development.  
  
7. Concluding remarks 
In cross country comparisons, distant history appears to be an important determinant of 
current economic performance.  This finding is often interpreted as evidence that early 
historical institutions have shaped current institutions.  An active and promising line of 
research in macroeconomics and development is now studying specific features of 
institutions, and how they propagate over time – see the discussion in Helpman (2004). 
  One of the contributions of this paper is to show that early political institutions 
emerge as an important determinant of current economic performance also in regional 
comparisons, and when controlling for national political institutions. Since this result is 
obtained by estimating a reduced form, it is not dependent on any particular identifying 
assumption. This finding in itself casts some doubts on the primacy of formal institutions 
as determinant of economic development. The regions in our sample have been ruled by 
the same formal institutions for at lest a few centuries, and yet we still find an economic 
legacy of early institutions. Something else, besides institutional inertia, must account for 
this legacy of history. 
  The same historical variables are also correlated with measures of regional 
culture, such as trust and respect for others, and confidence in individual self-
determination. To interpret this second finding, we need additional assumptions.  I have 
thus assumed that past political institutions and past literacy rates are valid instruments 
for culture in the output regression, holding constant any unobserved national variable, 
contemporaneous regional education and past urbanization rates. This led to the second 
and main contribution of this paper: the component of culture explained by the historical   31
variables is found to be an important determinant of regional economic performance. 
Under the identifying assumptions, this historically determined component of culture is 
exogenous. Moreover, we could not reject that culture entirely explains the economic 
legacy of history in our sample.  
Two sets of cultural traits appear to be favourable to economic development. The 
first trait resembles what earlier studies have called “social capital”, and is captured by 
the variables trust (having trust in other people) and respect (appreciating the virtue of 
being respectful of others in one’s own children). The second trait can be interpreted as 
confidence in the individual, and is captured by the variable control (feeling in control of 
one’s life) and, in a negative sense, by the variable obedience (appreciating obedience in 
one’s own children). These cultural traits are strongly correlated not only with the 
economic development of European regions, but also with economic development and 
institutional outcomes in a broad sample of countries. This suggests that the correlations 
described in this paper are not driven by measurement error or by peculiar features of the 
data. But the precise interpretation of these cultural indicators is difficult and remains to 
be studied in greater detail.  
As discussed at length in the previous section, several caveats apply to the 
identifying assumptions and to the power of the orthogonality tests. Nevertheless, the 
evidence supporting the relevance of institutions rests on similar assumptions and similar 
tests. Institutions too, like culture, are endogenous and imperfectly measured. And the 
exclusion restrictions imposed on cross country comparisons when interpreting the 
effects of colonial origin are not much better or worse than those imposed in this paper. 
An implication of this analysis, therefore, is that there is no primacy of formal 
institutions over culture. On the contrary, both are likely to interact and to shape the 
actual functioning of real world institutions, and to influence the incentives and the 
beavior of economic and political agents.  Of course, this paper only scratched the surface 
of how culture might influence economic performance. As treated in this paper, “culture” 
is still largely a black box. Much more work is needed at a microeconomic level to 
understand which features of individual beliefs and social norms are economically 
relevant, how they are formed and transmitted over time, how they interact with the 
economic and the institutional environment. The empirical results of this paper suggest 
that such a research effort could have high payoffs.  
The idea that culture is an important and lasting determinant of economic 
performance also has relevant policy implications for the regions of Europe. It is still   32
premature to draw firm conclusions from the correlations studied in this paper. But if 
confirmed by future research, these findings suggest that the low labor productivity of 
economically backward regions will not go away soon. They also suggests that income 
transfers and public investment are not a solution, because they don’t address the source 
of the problem. Instead, economically and culturally poor regions are likely to benefit 
from investments in education, from cheap sources of finance (to facilitate the emergence 
of local entrepreuneurs), and from decentralization of administrative and political powers 
(to stimulate the accumulation of social capital).  Finally, these findings reinforce the 
simple but often neglected idea that regions with lower productivity ought to pay lower 
real wages. A single national wage would concentrate unemployment in the poor regions 
(as it happened in Southern Italy and East Germany), self perpetuating the adverse 
cultural features that might be at the root of the low labor productivity in these regions.  
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A.1 Data Appendix 
 
agr_share: employment share in agriculture in 1977. Source: CRENOS, 
http://www.crenos.it/oldsito/databanks/european.html 
 
control: unconditional average response in each region (multiplied by 10) to the question: 
“Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while 
other people feel that what we do has no real effect on what happens to them.  Please use 
this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means “none at all” and  10 means “a great deal” to 
indicate how much freedom of choice and control in life you have over the way your life 
turns out”. Source: World Value Surveys, Inglehart et al. (2000). 
 
gadp: index of government's anti-diversion policies, measured around 1985. It is an 
equal-weighted average of these five categories: i) law and order, ii) bureaucratic quality, 
iii) corruption, iv) risk of expropriation and v) government repudiation of contracts (each 
of these items has higher values for governments with more effective policies towards 
supporting production) and ranges from zero to one. Source: Hall and Jones (1999). 
 
growth: average yearly growth, defined as the log difference of per capita Gross Value 
Added over the period 1977-2000. 
 
institutions_1600/_1700/_1750/_1800/_1850: constraints on the executive around that 
date. Higher values correspond to better institutions. For exact definitions and sources for 
each country see the historical appendix below. 
 
institutions_average: simple arithmetic average of the five variables measuring 
constraints on the executive at the five different points in time. 
 
institutions_weighted: weighted average of the five variables measuring constraints on 
the executive at the five different points in time, computed as follows: 
institutions_weighted = (0.5*institutions_1600 + 0.7*institutions_1700  + 
0.8*institutions_1750 + 0.9*institutions_1800 + institutions_1850)/(0.5+0.7+0.8+0.9+1) 
 
literacy: in general, percentage of persons who could read and write around 1880. For 
exact definitions and sources for each country see the historical appendix below. 
 
log-mortality : log of mortality of European settlers in colonies around the world. Source: 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) 
 
logyl: natural log of output per worker, measured in 1988. Source: Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
lyp77: log of per capita Gross Value Added in 1977. Source: Cambridge Econometrics. 
 
obedience: percentage of respondents that mention “obedience” as being important (the 
other qualities in the list being: “good manners; independence; tolerance and respect for 
others; hard work; feeling of responsibility; imagination; thrift, saving money and things; 
determination and perseverance; religious faith; unselfishness”) to the question: “Here is 
a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you 
consider to be especially important?  Please choose up to five”. Source: World Value 
Surveys, Inglehart et al. (2000). 
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pc_children: regional average (multiplied by 100) of first principal components extracted 
from the cultural variables which express desirables qualities for children (obedience, 
respect). 
 
pc_culture: regional average (multiplied by 100) of first principal components extracted 
from the four cultural variables (control, obedience, respect, trust). 
 
pc_culture_pos: regional average (multiplied by 100) of first principal components 
extracted from the positive cultural variables (control, respect, trust). 
 
pc_institutions: first principal component of the five variables measuring constraints on 
the executive at the five different points in time. 
 
pro-monarchy:  percentage of votes in favour of the monarchy in the Italian referendum 
held in 1946. Source: Ufficio Elettorale del Ministero degli Interni, data collected by 
Andrea Ichino, European University Institute, Florence.  
 
protestant: percentage of the population in each country professing the Protestant religion 
in 1980. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
respect: percentage of respondents in each region that has mentioned the quality 
“tolerance and respect for other people” as being important (the other qualities in the list 
being: “good manners; independence; obedience; hard work; feeling of responsibility; 
imagination; thrift, saving money and things; determination and perseverance; religious 
faith; unselfishness”) to the question: “Here is a list of qualities that children can be 
encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?  
Please choose up to five”. Source: World Value Surveys, Inglehart et al. (2000). 
 
school: gross enrolment rate of primary and secondary school in 1960. Data 
disaggregated in regions but for Ireland and the Netherlands for which data have national 
aggregation. Great Britain is divided into North Ireland, Scotland, England and Wales. 
Source: National Statistical Institutes. 
 
sum_culture: sum of the three positive beliefs (control, respect, trust) minus the negative 
belief (obedience). 
 
trust: percentage of respondents who answer that “Most people can be trusted” (the other 
possible answers being “Can’t be too careful” and “Don’t know”) to the question 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?”. Source: World Value Surveys, Inglehart et al. 
(2000). 
 
Urb_rate1850:  percentage of regional population that lived in cities of size above 30 000 
in 1850 (regional population data refer to 1860, while city size data refer to 1850).   
 
yp9500: average over the period of 1995-2000 of Gross Value Added (GVA) in 
international prices (adjusted for purchasing power) expressed as in percent of the EU15 
average.  GVA corresponds to GDP at “basic prices”, ie. It excludes taxes on products 
(mainly VAT and excise duties). Source: Cambridge Econometrics 
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A.2 Historical appendix: data on literacy 
 
Belgium: percentage of population over 6 years old able to read and write 1880. Source: 
Flora(1983). 
Britain and Wales: percentage of brides and grooms signing the Marriage Register in 
1870. Data were disaggregated by counties and were aggregated using the county 
population statistics in 1870 contained in Mitchell(1988). Source: Stephens(1973). 
France: percentage of population over 6 years old able to read and write (in  
1872). Source: ICPSR 0048 (2001). 
Germany: percentage of population able to read in 1871. Source: Cipolla(1969).
22 
The Netherlands: data extrapolated from literacy of military recruits (percentage of 
recruits able to read) around 1870. The extrapolation was obtained from a regression of 
the available literacy data on the variable literacy of recruits in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy (data aggregated at country level).   
Ireland: percentage of population over 10 years old able to read in 1880. Source: 
Flora(1983). 
Italy: percentage of population over 6 years old able to read in 1881. Source Flora(1983). 
Portugal: percentage of population over 7 years old able to read and write in 1890. Data 
not regionally disaggregated. Source: Cipolla(1969). 
Scotland: percentage of brides and grooms signing the Marriage Register in 1880. 
Source: Flora(1983). 




A.3 Historical Appendix: data on urbanization rates in 1850 
 
Except for three regions (Madeira, Azore Islands and Canary islands), the size city data 
are from Bairoch, Batou and Chèvre (1988). 
 
City size data for Madeira (apart from Ponta Delgada), Azore Islands and Canary islands 
are from the University of Utrecht population statistics database 
(http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/populhome.html) 
       
Regional population data are from the University of Utrecht population statistics database 
(http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/populhome.html), which in turn relies the 
following specific sources:  
Belgium  Year: 1862 estimate, Source: Almanach de Gotha  
France  Year: 1861 census, Source: French Statistical Institute INSEE 
Germany  Year: 1867 estimate, Source: Almanach de Gotha  
                                                 
22 For the cities of Bremen and Hamburg we took the simple arithmetic average of their respective regions 
(Hannover and Schleswig-Holstein). The correspondence between the regions in the dataset and the regions 
in the source data is the following: Hessen: Hessen-Nassau; Niedersachsen: Hannover; NordRhein-
Westfalen: Vestfalia; Rhineland-Pfalz: Rhineland; Schleswig-Holstein: Schleswig-Holstein. For the regions 
Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bayern we took a simple arithmetic average of Cipolla’s data, excluding the 
most eastern regions of the Prussian Kingdom which are not part of today’s Germany. Data for East 
Germany is given by the simple arithmetic average of the Prussian regions which approximately constitute 
today’s eastern German part (Brandburg, Pomeran, Sachsen). 
23 The correspondence between the regions in the dataset and the regions in the source data is the following 
(excepts regions which had the same name): Asturias-Cantabria: Astur; Pais Vasco: Basque Country; 
Navarra-Rioja: Navarra; Castilla-Leon: Old Castilla+Leon; Castilla-La Mancha: New Castile; 
Extremadura: New Castile; Comunidad Valencia: Levante; Andalucia: Western+Eastern Andalusia; 
Murcia: Levante. Whenever two regions needed to be aggregated, since we had no data on population, we 
used a simple arithmetic average.   41
Italy  Year: 1861 census, Source: Almanach de Gotha  
Netherlands  Year: 1859/60 census, Source: Almanach de Gotha 
Portugal  Year: 1862 estimate, Source: Almanach de Gotha  
Spain  Year: 1860 census, Source: Almanach de Gotha  
U.K.  Year: 1861 census, Source: Almanach de Gotha  
 
A.4 Historical appendix: data on political institutions 
 
A.3.1 Constraints on the executive 
Our measure of political institutions refers to the variable “constraint on the executive” in 
the POLITY IV dataset. This variable ranges from 1 to 7, with higher values 
corresponding to more checks and balances on executive powers and a more accountable 
executive. 
  A value of 1 corresponds to a situation in which there are no regular limitations on 
the executive’s actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or 
actuality of coups and assassinations).  To quote from POLITY IV : “Absolutist 
monarchies, regardless of their openness to public dissent or respect for civil liberties, are 
typically coded here. In other words, this code is not used to differentiate between 
benevolent absolute monarchs and malevolent ones. So long as constraints on their power 
are non-existent, it is coded here.” 
  A value of 3 describes executives that face real but limited constraints. For 
instance, there is a legislative body which has more than just consultative functions, but 
can also delay implementation of executive decrees, or can initiate some categories of 
legislation.  
  A value of 5 corresponds to an executive having more effective authority than any 
accountability group but subject to substantial constraints by them. Examples are  a 
legislature that often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action; a council or 
legislature that sometimes refuses funds to the executive; an accountability group that 
makes important appointments to administrative posts. 
  Finally, a value of 7 corresponds to a situation in which accountability groups 
have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most activity.  Most 
consolidated democracies fall in this category.  
  The values of 2, 4 and 6 correspond to transitions between the above situations.  
 
A.3.2 General sources and criteria 
Our first task was to account for the territorial changes that took place in Europe between 
1600 and 1850. In doing that we referred mainly to the historical maps provided in G. 
Duby (2001) and J. and A. Sellier (2002).  
When regions did not have substantial political autonomy, we assigned to all 
regions in the same country the value of constraints in the executive coded by POLITY 
IV (if available) or by Acemoglu et al. (2002). This procedure took care of  France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal and most of Spain and of the UK. Northern Ireland was 
given the same values Acemoglu et al. (2002) give to Ireland.  
In all other cases, we coded the variable “constraints on the executive” ourselves, 
with the same criteria used in POLITY IV and considering the historical situation in a 40 
year window around each date. For example to assign the values of constraints on 
executive in 1700, we considered the situation from 1680 to 1720. This is the same 
procedure used by Acemoglu et al. (2002).  
Below we summarize some of the main stylized facts on which we based our 
coding decisions, when we could not rely on Acemoglu et al. (2002) nor on POLITY IV.  
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A.3.3 Italy in 1600, 1700 and 1750 
Our main sources for this period are Galasso (1972), (1976) and Enciclopedia Italiana 
Treccani. 
 
State of Milan. 
From 1535 to 1713, the State of Milan was part of Charles V’s Empire, and at his 
abdication (1555) it passed under the control of the Spanish Monarchy. During this 
period Milan lost political autonomy in foreign affairs, although it maintained its own 
legal and administrative structures, at least to some extent. In 1541, the Emperor Charles 
V promulgated the “New Constitutions”. This act should not be read just as an attempt to 
centralize the political structure of the Lombard dominion and reduce its autonomy. 
Lombard jurists drafted the Chart on the basis of local legal traditions and when Charles 
adopted it, he acted like a successor of the Sforza and a caretaker of the local traditions. 
Charles V and his Spanish successors intervened to control the functioning of the Milan 
administration and to guarantee the obedience of their subjects; but they did that mainly 
when they had to deal with specific and concrete financial or military issues. Charles V 
and his Spanish successors left the administrative structures of Milan substantially as it 
was in 1535. 
  The State was organized in provinces that had large autonomy in matter of 
economic policies, taxation, public order and roads. Because of their long tradition of 
autonomy, the central government did not exert strong control on the provinces. At the 
level of central government, power was shared between the offices controlled by the 
Spanish Monarchy and those derived from the ducal age. The office more directly 
controlled by Spain was the Governor. This king’s “alter ego” was at the top of the 
administrative structure in Milan and had the authority of promulgating or changing laws. 
The Governor was usually in charge for few years and was mainly absorbed in military 
issues. He had to deal with the local collective bodies, first of all the Senate. These 
collective bodies had a deep knowledge of the Lombard reality and managed to defend 
their own prerogatives. The Senate had strong powers in implementing the law and the 
king’s pardons, and was able to exert strong influence on the whole legislation. The 
senate often refused to implement the Governor’ s deliberations, appealing against  them 
to the king’s final decision. In this way, the Senate was often able to stop the Governor 
acts. This situation gave room to large autonomy and even to insubordinations to his 
authority. Since the beginning of the Spanish domination, there was strong disagreement 
between   Milan local institutions and the Governor every time he tried to limit their 
powers.  Philip the Second in 1580 tried to limit some large discretionary powers of the 
Senate, especially in the field of pardon implementation or law interpretation. But even 
after this attempt, the Senate remained a strong check on the Governor’s authority. The 
other Spanish kings respected existing local institutions and tried to maintain an 
equilibrium between the Governor and the Senate. They also looked for cooperation with 
local elites, without which it would have been too difficult to govern the State of Milan. 
Under the Utrecht Treaty of 1713, Milan passed to the Austria Monarchy. But 
until 1760, any Crown’s attempt to modify the institutional and administrative structure 
of the State  failed. Thus, the internal equilibrium of power remained the same as it had 
been for centuries.  
In the 1760s Vienna, under Maria Teresa, showed a strong will to strength its 
royal authority and to discipline local powers. Since 1765, supreme magistracies 
(including the Senate) were deprived of important prerogatives, and the local elites  lost 
substantial influence over the State. An irreversible process of change took place. In 1765 
a Supreme Council of the Economy was founded, that looked like the symbol of 
Hapsburg absolutism. The Supreme Council exerted huge power in controlling economic   43
and financial affairs and was completely subordinated to the government authority, in 
spite of the secular autonomist tradition of the ancient magistracies.  
The building up of the new State went on until 1790, also under Maria Teresa’s 
successor Giuseppe II. He was strongly committed to make the rules of the whole 
Austria’s dominions similar and to absorb local powers in a hierarchical bureaucracy, so 
as to eliminate even the last traces of self-organization within the society. In Milan this 
process peaked with the suppression of the Senate (1786), for many centuries symbol of 
the Lombard autonomy. 
Reflecting this evolution, this is how we coded the variable “constraints on the 
executives” in Lombardy up to 1750. We assigned a value 3 in 1600 and 1700 because of 
the existence of some real constraints over executive power, and 2 in 1750 to account for 




Since the beginning of the XVII century, the Savoia’ s Monarchy was nearly autocratic. 
Court aristocracy, for instance, formed the Secret Council, but this Council was 
practically without any political relevance. The Monarchy became even more absolutistic 
under king Vittorio Amedeo II, from the Utrecht peace (1713) to the year of his 
abdication (1730). Vittorio Amedeo’ s absolute Monarchy was very similar to the 
classical French model of Louis XIV, with strong central bureaucratic structures. The 
provincial intendants linked central government and local communities, fighting local 
particularities and imposing a high degree of administrative homogeneity. During this 
consolidation period, the village assemblies stopped working and local communities lost 
their residual autonomy, adopting the administrative frameworks suggested and imposed 
by the central authorities. The three Senates of Piemonte, Chambéry and Nizza did not 
represent a threat for the monarchic absolutism, but were a source of Crown’s high 
bureaucrats. The State, characterized by autocratic paternalism at the top and by passivity 
and obedience at the bottom, became a typical example of an absolute monarchy. Such an 
institutional set up, improved and made more efficient by Vittorio Amedeo’ s successors, 
lasted for the whole XVIII century. 
We gave Piemonte a value of 2 in 1600 and 1700 and of 1 in 1750; by this last 
date the absolutistic regime was perfectly set up.   
 
Tuscany 
Under Cosimo I de Medici ( 1537 -1574 ) the building up and consolidation of an 
absolute State gradually took place in Tuscany. The new Prince tried to build up a 
monarchic State similar to those prevailing in Europe, while at the same time preserving 
some aspects of the older republican institutions and norms. The main breakdown with 
the past was the attribution of the legislative power to the Prince. The Constitution of 
1532 was still in force and stipulated that the the Council (“Il Consiglio dei 200”) and the 
Senate (“Il Senato dei 48”) would take part in the legislative process and in law 
implementation. These two collective bodies lasted for the whole Medici regime. They 
also elected some important magistracies. Even though the Prince formally respected the 
prerogatives of the Senate and of the Council’, he ended up by concentrating the 
legislative power in his hands. To some extent, Ferdinado I (1587 – 1609) mitigated the 
centralizing process initiated by his father Cosimo I. In a framework of partial 
liberalization, he gave more relevant power to the “Consulta”. The main task of this 
body, formally established in 1550, was to admit appeals against ordinary magistracy 
sentences and to give advice on law formulation and elaboration. Ferdinado I promoted 
also a wider citizen participation in local magistracies. This institutional framework   44
remained substantially unchanged up to the end of the Medici regime (1737). In 1737 
Tuscany passed to the Lorena’s dynasty, and especially when Pietro Leopoldo came to 
the throne (1765) it fell under the dependence of the Austrian Crown. 
We assigned a value of 2 to Tuscany in 1600 and 1700, in consideration of the 
gradual building up of an absolutistic regime. In 1750 we gave the same value Acemoglu 
et al. (2002) assign to Austria, namely 1. 
 
Papal State  
Since the end of the XVIth century, the Papal State was like an absolute monarchy. 
Similarly to what happened in other European countries, there was a process of 
increasing administrative centralization and of more relevant governmental control over 
peripheries. Yet, the Papal State was not able to reach a really homogenous institutional 
structure. The Northern Legation of Bologna, Ravenna, Forlì and Ferrara had more 
autonomy: many laws (for instance fiscal or custom rules) were implemented with 
exceptions and derogations concerning this area. In particular Bologna, the second town 
of the State, played an important role as leader of the whole Legation area. On the basis 
of “Capitula” of 1447, the city was ruled by a diarchy made of a Legate of the Pope and 
of a large and representative Senate. Bologna was able to maintain a special regime of 
local magistracies, in charge of justice administration and fiscal legislation. The city of 
Ferrara too was ruled by a Papal Legate and by a Council of 100 citizens, but here the 
Papal Legate was able to exercise more power.  
In 1600, 1700 and 1750 we assign to the northern region of the Papal State 
(Emilia – Romagna) a value of 2, and to the remaining ones (Lazio, Umbria and Marche) 
a value of 1. 
 
Venice  
The Doge was the leader of the Republic of Venice and one of its most relevant political 
institutions. Even thought he was chosen by means of sophisticated elections, he was 
appointed for life. His power was constrained by several checks and balances. The Doge 
presided over the most important Councils of the Republic, but only together with his 
Advisors and the three Chiefs of “La Quarantìa”. These individuals formed a body called 
“La Serenissima Signoria”. The Doge could convene a meeting of the most important 
Republican Councils only with the agreement of “La Serenissima Signoria”.  
The sovereign power over the Republic was up to “Il Maggior Consiglio”, the 
assembly of Venice’s elite. All laws became effective only after ratification by this 
Council. The Council also elected several magistrates and members of other collective 
bodies, such as the Senate, “Il Consiglio dei X” and “I Procuratori di San Marco”. This 
last body had the judiciary task of safeguarding the Republic’s political and institutional 
system. Over time, the Senate acquired growing relevance and played a key role in the 
Venice’s political life. 
To account for a regime in which the executive had effective power but was 
subject to substantial constraints and was accountable to other collective bodies, we 
assigned to Venice a value of 5 in 1600, 1700 and 1750. 
  
Republic of Genoa  
In 1576 the Republic of Genoa provided itself with a new Constitution, which was in 
force until 1797. The executive power was shared between the Doge (appointed for two 
years) and a collective body made up of two Councils, “ I Collegi”. To avoid 
authoritarian risks, the new Constitution imposed stronger limits on their power than in 
the past. The competence on penal matters was subtracted to the executive organs and 
granted to an independent one, “La Rota Criminale”. The Constitution increased the   45
powers of the two Councils (Lower and Upper). The Lower Council, made up of 100 
members, acquired increasing relevance under the new constitution: it approved 
legislation and it took decisions on the most important political issues of the Republic. 
The Lower Council designated the so called “Thirty Electors”, that in turn had to choose 
the members of the two Councils, at the moment of their renovation. The ancient 
magistracy (“I Supremi Sindacatori”) also had outstanding relevance in this constitutional 
framework. They controlled each Governor after he left office, and acted as a 
Constitutional Court controlling the decisions of the two Councils – although in the end 
the Lower Council had the final word.  
We can consider Genoa as having an institutional framework in which the 
authority of the executive is relevant but at the same time subject to real checks and 
balances and some accountability. Accordingly, we coded Genoa with a value of 5 in 
1600, 1700 and 1750. 
 
The Kingdom of Naples  
Since 1600 the Kingdom of Naples was an absolutistic and autocratic monarchy. We give 
it a value of 1 for all the period under consideration.  
 
A.3.4 Italy in 1800 and 1850 
To code constraints on the executive in 1800 in Italy we focused mainly on the historical 
events of Napoleonic period. As general rule, we coded the Italian regions with 1, 
because after complex vicissitudes they fell directly or indirectly under Napoleone’ s 
control. Nevertheless, we gave a value 2 to Lombardy, Emilia–Romagna and Liguria, to 
account for the brief republican experiences they lived in this lapse of time. For instance, 
in 1796 Cispadana and Transpadana Republics were created respectively in Lombardy 
and Emilia-Romagna. In 1797 they merged into the Cisalpina Republic, which survived 
until 1802
24. The Republic of Liguria, established in 1797, lasted until 1805 when it was 
annexed to the French Empire.  
Italy became a unified and independent State in 1861. To code constraints on 
executive in 1850, we focused on the so called Restoration period. Using the information 
provided by Polity IV, we coded Tuscany, the Papal State and the Two Sicilies with 1; 
Piemonte and Liguria, which were part of the Kingdom of Sardinia, were coded as 3
25. 
Autocratic regimes, established by the Council of Vienna of 1815, ruled the remaining 
Italian States, so we gave them value of 1 in 1850. 
 
A.3.5 Germany  
During these centuries, Germany consisted of several territorial entities, in many cases 
difficult to relate to present-day Landers. As general rule, German Landers were coded 
with a value of 1 in 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850, following Acemoglu et al.(2002). 
But there are some exceptions, namely some territorial entities not characterized by 
autocratic institutions and that we can clearly relate to today Landers. For some of these 
entitities, we have information provided by Polity IV dataset.  Our sources on Germany 
are Asch (1988), Vierhaus (1988) and Graves (2001). 
 
Baden-Wurttemberg 
                                                 
24 In this year the Cisalpina Republic became the so called Italian Republic, that survived until 1805. 
25 The Isle of Sardegna was part of the this Kingdom too. But in our dataset we consider  Sicilia and 
Sardegna as one territorial entity (too few observations on culture are available to code Sardinia as a 
separate entity).    46
During the period under consideration, Baden and Wurttemberg were two distinct 
territorial entities. The values assigned to the current Lander of Baden-Wurttemberg are 
the simple average of those we gave to each of part.  
Following Acemoglu et al.(2002), we coded Baden as 1 in the years 1600, 1700, 
1750 and 1800.  Following Polity IV we code it as 3 in 1850 (Polity IV gives Baden a 3 
between 1819 and 1871).  
Wurttemberg had more advancec political institutions. After the Thirty Years War 
(1648) Germany experienced a general decline of territorial Estates and a strengthening 
of autocratic regimes. But the Assembly of Wurttemberg (Landtag) was able to preserve 
its political position in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This Assembly was 
made up of delegates of the towns and of protestant prelates; it mainly had the right to 
approve taxation and to control the fiscal management. Permanent parliamentary 
committees worked whenever the full assembly was not summoned. These bodies not 
only had fiscal and administrative competences, but also played an important rule in the 
decision-making about governmental and economic matters.  The Wurttemberg’ s 
Landtag was thus able to exert real constraints over the executive power
26. We thus 
assigned a value 3 to Wurttemberg in 1600, 1700, 1750 and 1800. Polity IV assigns to 




After the early XVIIth century, the Assembly of Bayern became ineffective and under 
ducal control. Following Acemoglu et al. (2002), we thus assigned a value of 1 to Bayern 
for 1600, 1700 and 1750. The values of 1 and 3 for 1800 and 1850 respectively derive 
from information provided by the Polity IV dataset.  
 
Bremen-Hamburg 
 The two Landers of Bremen and Hamburg are considered as one entity in our data set. 
The values assigned to Bremen-Hamburg are the simple average of those given to each 
part.  
Bremen and Hamburg were two of the few free cities (Freiestadt) that survived 
until the XIX century and entered the German Confederation in 1815.  Free cities had to 
pay taxes directly to the Empire. They were usually ruled by magistrates, althought their 
sovereignty could vary from one city to an other. Political power was generally in the 
hands of the patriciate or more often of guildes. For instance, Bremen established an 
aristocratic constitution in 1433, that gave power to the local patriciate. In Hamburg, a 
council of delegates of guildes of merchants and artisans shared the political power with 
the ancient aristocratic Senate since the XVI century.  We coded Bremen and Hamburg 
as 3 in 1600, 1700, 1750 and 1800.  
In 1815, Bremen established a republican constitution that provided separation of 
power and an aristocratic system of designation to public offices by cooptation. 
Legislative power was up to an elected Council of Citizens (Burgerschaft), made up of 
150 members. A 16 member Senate exercised the executive power. The Council elected 
its members under instruction of the Senate itself. We thus assigned a value of 5 to 
Bremen in 1850. As we don’t have evidence of relevant institutional change in Hamburg 
over the same period, we retain the value of 3.    
 
                                                 
26 Polity IV codes Wurttemberg from 1800 to 1818 as 3.As we have no evidence of striking institutional 
changes at the beginning of the XIX century in comparison with the two previous centuries, this confirms 
our coding.  In 1819 a new constitution was established in Wurttemberg, and after this year Polity IV gives 
it a value of 5.    47
Hessen  
The Assembly of Hessen was quite powerful in the distant past and further increased its 
relevance at the end of XVI century. Like other German principalities, Hessen 
experienced several religious conflicts, which weakened the regime of Maurice of Hesse–
Cassel (1592 – 1627). He thus became increasingly dependent on the support of the 
Estates for defence and military matters, and for taxation. In 1627 eventually he was 
forced by the Assembly to abdicate in favour of his son  William V (1627 – 1637). To 
account for these checks and balances, we assigned to Hessen a value  of 3 in 1600. 
Over time the Estates lost their authority because of conflicts and divisions 
between towns and nobility. After 1655, this enabled William IV to unilaterally impose 
taxes in emergencies and, when convenient, to ask the Assembly for retrospective 
consent. Following Acemoglu et al. (2002), we assigned to Hessen value a value of 1 in 
1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850. 
 
A.3.6  Spain 
Our sources for Spain are Graves (2001), Ortiz (1988), Menedéz Pidal and Jover Zamora 
(1987).  As general rule we assigned to the Spanish regions the same values that 
Acemoglu et al.(2002) give to Spain. Nevertheless, in the XVII century there were some 
relevant differences between Castile and other Spanish regions, namely the eastern 
kingdoms of Aragon (Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia). These three regions integrated in 
the Spanish Crown maintaining their own laws, organization and institutions. In 
particular these regions preserved their own Parliaments, the “Cortes”, as guarantors of 
local freedoms and prerogatives. In the kingdoms of Aragon, people usually thought 
about the monarchic power as a contractual one, so any Castile’ s king had to comply 
with “constitutions”  or “fueros” of these regions. These constraints over the royal 
sovereignty, especially in the fiscal and military fields, stood against the absolutistic 
tendencies prevailing at that time in Spain, sometimes giving rise to episodes of tension 
and conflict
27. The Cortes not only had some veto powers over taxation, but had other 
important legislative prerogatives. Since the basis of the royal power was contractual, the 
kings could enact laws only with the consent of the Cortes of Aragon. In the XVII 
century the relevance of these Cortes was declining in comparison to the previous 
centuries, and the Spanish kings did not summon them very often. Nevertheless, when 
they met, the Cortes kept dealing with fiscal, political and legislative matters. Moreover, 
each of the Cortes of the kingdoms of Aragon had permanent committees (called 
“Diputaciòn” or “Generalitat”) endowed with fiscal competences. Over time, these 
permanent committees acquired also political and economic relevance and often acted as 
caretakers of local liberties. To account for this institutional framework of the kingdoms 
of Aragon, we assigned value 3 in 1600 to the Spanish regions of Aragon, Catalonia and 
Valencia.   
At the beginning of the XVIII century, the ancient institutions of the three 
kingdoms of Aragon were abolished. To account for this period of transition towards 
autocratic regimes, we assigned to the regions of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia the 
value 2 in 1700.  
In all subsequent dates, all Spanish regions are given the same values that 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) give to Spain. 
 
                                                 
27 We can mention the crisis between Aragon and Spanish Crown in 1592, the refuse of Cortes of Catalonia 
to consent to taxation in 1626, the rebellion  that occurred again in Catalonia in 1640-1659, and finally the 
less known and relevant successes of Valencia in 1645-1648.  Table 1 – Correlation among cultural variables 
 
  pc_culture pc_culture_pos pc_children sum_culture  trust  control  respect 
pc_culture_pos  0.82            
pc_children  0.81 0.46           
sum_culture  0.99 0.82  0.80         
trust  0.60 0.65  0.11  0.62       
control  0.32 0.60  0.03  0.31  0.06     
respect  0.55 0.56  0.74  0.55  0.05  0.03   
obedience  -0.65 -0.12  -0.74  -0.64  -0.11  -0.01  -0.10 
 
N. observations: 20902 
 Table 2 – Culture in the 1990s  
Country Region  trust  control  obedience  respect  pc_culture  pc_culture_pos pc_children sum_culture 
Belgium VLAAMS  GEWEST  37.72 60.17 42.69 71.79 -12.43 -9.80 -14.52  127.00 
Belgium REGION  WALLONNE  28.87 63.26 29.93 54.56 -21.76  -32.58  -24.68  116.76 
Belgium  REG.BRUXELLES-CAP./BRUSSELS HFDST.GEW.  26.90 64.08 25.55 71.43  1.46 -14.80 9.82 136.85 
France  ILE DE FRANCE  26.22 58.98 55.14 76.76 -37.17  -20.34  -24.37  106.82 
France NORTH  FR  17.05 58.55 46.15 79.12 -34.09  -32.88 -7.35 108.56 
France EAST  FR  19.19 59.93 50.47 75.70 -38.00  -21.26  -19.33  104.36 
France WEST  FR  26.72 58.45 50.00 79.58 -26.49  -20.45  -12.19  114.75 
France SOUTH  WEST  FR  30.19 56.08 54.13 77.98 -33.17  -19.98  -20.86  110.13 
France  SOUTH EAST FR  24.79 56.65 53.66 85.37 -29.04  -19.84 -7.86 113.14 
France MEDITERREAN  FR  22.00 59.91 59.05 79.05 -40.93  -24.64  -26.24  101.91 
France  PARIS BASIN EAST/WEST  14.18 57.61 52.14 72.14 -56.69  -49.99  -27.70 91.79 
Italy  PIEMONTE - VALLLE D'AOSTA  37.76 60.84 28.29 72.37 11.45 -5.68  7.40 142.68 
Italy LIGURIA  37.69 64.35 25.00 74.29 17.75  5.74  15.39  151.33 
Italy LOMBARDIA  44.30 63.12 19.84 70.85 24.94  5.29  17.18  158.43 
Italy  TRENTINO ALTO ADIGE - VENETO - FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA  48.96 65.72 25.70 82.33 40.49 31.25 27.78  171.31 
Italy EMILIA-ROMAGNA  30.84 62.22 25.45 73.64  9.98  -9.57 13.65  141.25 
Italy TOSCANA  35.53 49.69 36.71 70.89 -30.00  -45.67 -7.33 119.39 
Italy  UMBRIA - MARCHE  35.94 56.00 36.43 68.22 -20.46  -30.22  -11.38  123.72 
Italy LAZIO  27.70 64.07 35.90 66.03 -23.12  -26.47  -14.25  121.91 
Italy CAMPANIA  28.01 62.90 45.69 48.56 -50.73  -45.25  -57.62 93.79 
Italy  ABRUZZI - MOLISE - BASILICATA  29.31 50.29 24.19 75.81 -10.64  -39.09 19.10  131.22 
Italy PUGLIA  29.17 65.40 35.14 56.76 -30.81  -31.44  -28.59  116.19 
Italy CALABRIA  37.35 54.34 45.35 59.30 -34.74  -37.62  -39.22  105.64 
Italy  SICILIA - SARDEGNA  26.87 59.68 32.27 61.82 -25.67  -39.82  -15.99  116.09 
Netherlands  NOORD NEDERLAND - GRONINGEN  47.30 60.00 34.21 81.58 18.52 14.33 14.14  154.67 
Netherlands OOST  NEDERLAND  64.14 53.69 35.90 92.31 47.20 36.04 29.57  174.24 
Netherlands WEST  NEDERLAND  53.16 58.64 30.54 86.63 37.49 26.00 27.90  167.89 
Netherlands ZUID  NEDERLAND  50.00 57.18 33.45 86.48 28.16 18.83 23.41  160.21 
Portugal NORTE  21.15 59.55 56.07 65.03 -56.56  -41.43  -45.28 89.65 
Portugal CENTRO  (P)  19.71 63.32 50.00 65.71 -46.06  -33.24  -35.30 98.74 
Portugal  LISBOA E VALE DO TEJO  22.77 63.20 38.14 68.59 -25.35  -26.89  -13.24  116.42 
Portugal ALGARVE  26.09 63.16 39.13 79.35 -9.08 -8.82  3.26 129.47 
Portugal ALENTEJO  17.78 61.24 51.58 66.32 -45.33  -37.83  -36.60 93.75 
Portugal MADEIRA  23.85 60.86 65.77 63.06 -65.13  -36.17  -62.68 82.01 
Portugal AZORE  ISLANDS  19.54 58.79 43.82 65.17 -42.16  -43.76  -27.21 99.67 
Spain GALICIA  31.03 62.92 40.36 78.50 -5.39 -3.23  0.09 132.09 
Spain ASTURIAS-CANTABRIA  31.86 61.26 49.11 76.79 -17.87 -9.25 -15.54  120.81 
Spain PAIS  VASCO  40.34 63.40 30.84 80.80 21.61 13.82 17.75  153.70 
Spain  NAVARRA - RIOJA  41.13 68.48 36.99 71.92  6.54  12.47 -6.01 144.55 Country Region  trust  control  obedience  respect  pc_culture  pc_culture_pos pc_children sum_culture 
Spain ARAGON  55.93 60.04 42.98 76.03 14.84 19.46 -7.87 149.03 
Spain MADRID  41.72 64.77 28.09 75.05 21.45 12.69 12.16  153.44 
Spain CASTILLA-LEON  42.20 60.99 34.96 73.35  3.99  -2.00 -0.68 141.57 
Spain CASTILLA-LA  MANCHA  32.60 63.18 33.68 74.61  4.77  -1.52  3.30 136.71 
Spain EXTREMADURA  26.39 65.83 46.41 75.82 -21.20 -4.19 -13.22  121.63 
Spain CATALUNA  34.40 60.86 44.91 79.48 -6.74 -1.12 -4.93 129.84 
Spain COMUNIDAD  VALENCIANA  24.50 64.48 44.33 79.35 -13.35 -7.22 -4.31 124.00 
Spain BALEARES  23.66 53.13 35.71 81.63 -16.31  -33.56 12.04  122.70 
Spain ANDALUCIA  24.48 66.64 52.91 75.45 -26.58 -6.25 -23.31  113.66 
Spain MURCIA  34.17 61.51 35.38 77.69 -1.96 -5.65  5.95 137.99 
Spain CANARIAS  23.57 67.21 44.51 85.37 -6.67  3.80  5.46 131.63 
UK NORTH  UK  26.45 63.74 56.45 80.65 -35.89  -11.79  -19.80  114.38 
UK EAST  MIDLANDS  33.58 70.90 46.43 84.29 20.79 36.20  0.86 142.33 
UK EAST  ANGLIA  47.41 69.63 53.45 71.55  6.11  31.67 -30.59  135.15 
UK  SOUTH EAST UK  39.63 67.51 42.65 84.94 35.25 39.47  7.45 149.43 
UK SOUTH  WEST  UK  34.25 65.85 41.94 87.10 23.77 29.04 12.09  145.27 
UK WEST  MIDLANDS  41.42 60.99 38.87 85.83 33.48 21.14 14.45  149.37 
UK NORTH  WEST  UK  32.38 65.56 44.80 74.80 -6.46 -3.02 -12.58  127.94 
UK WALES  40.75 66.31 47.26 79.57  6.91  22.63 -8.20 139.38 
UK SCOTLAND  39.24 67.74 52.36 83.62  8.25  28.38 -8.87 138.25 
UK NORTHERN  IRELAND  43.62 71.61 55.92 79.93  3.45  36.82 -20.21  139.25 
UK  YORKSHIRE AND HUMBERSIDE  34.07 68.11 38.79 83.62 14.85 19.20 10.87  147.01 
West Germany  BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG  44.13 67.38 16.59 84.75 51.65 34.38 45.09  179.67 
West Germany  BAYERN  34.59 67.62 21.16 76.49 26.39 12.12 24.67  157.54 
West Germany  BREMEN HAMBURG  35.53 70.76 10.53 87.37 57.22 36.46 58.28  183.13 
West Germany  HESSEN  32.77 65.69 17.86 80.36 33.50  9.66  35.92  160.96 
West Germany  NIEDERSACHSEN  43.79 67.83 16.43 83.85 47.57 28.67 43.82  179.05 
West Germany  NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN  39.70 67.86 19.04 80.74 39.81 23.34 34.83  169.26 
West Germany  RHEINLAND-PFALZ SAARLAND  42.51 65.95 22.69 82.35 40.71 27.63 32.21  168.13 
West Germany  SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN  34.19 66.25 16.54 75.94 22.80  3.37  30.47  159.83 
 Table 3 – Culture and output: OLS estimates, unweighted 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. variable  yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 
school  0.77 0.51 0.38 0.52 0.49 0.47 0.37 0.78 
  (0.40)*  (0.37) (0.38) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35)  (0.34)** 
  (0.19)***  (0.13)*** (0.14)** (0.10)***  (0.11)***  (0.13)*** (0.12)** (0.16)*** 
urb_rate1850  0.71 0.8 0.62  0.74  0.62  0.62  0.61  0.71 
  (0.23)*** (0.22)***  (0.23)**  (0.21)*** (0.20)*** (0.20)*** (0.21)*** (0.20)*** 
  (0.25)** (0.27)** (0.23)**  (0.20)***  (0.21)** (0.21)** (0.18)** (0.21)** 
control  1.36         
  ( 0 . 8 8 )          
  ( 0 . 3 9 ) * *          
trust    0.93        
    ( 0 . 4 2 ) * *         
    ( 0 . 5 3 )           
obedience     - 0 . 9 3        
     ( 0 . 4 5 ) * *        
     ( 0 . 6 4 )        
respect      1.64      
      (0.46)***      
      ( 0 . 6 3 ) * *       
pc_culture       0.58     
       (0.14)***     
       ( 0 . 1 7 ) * *      
sum_culture        0.77    
        (0.19)***    
        (0.21)***    
pc_children         0.57   
         (0.17)***   
         (0.27)*   
pc_culture_pos          0.71 
          (0.16)*** 
          (0.11)*** 
Obs  69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Adj R-squared  0.46 0.48 0.47 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.57 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary correlations within countries) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country dummy variables are always included Table 4 – Culture and income: OLS estimates, weighted by number of individuals polled in each region 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. variable  yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 
school  1.51 0.97 0.29 1.18 0.47 0.45 0.33 1.14 
  (0.44)***  (0.42)**  (0.48) (0.35)*** (0.39)  (0.39)  (0.39) (0.36)*** 
  (0.38)*** (0.38)**  (0.34)  (0.26)***  (0.13)*** (0.16)**  (0.22)  (0.22)*** 
urb_rate1850  0.77 0.79 0.59  0.8  0.64 0.66 0.61 0.75 
  (0.23)*** (0.22)*** (0.22)*** (0.20)*** (0.20)*** (0.20)*** (0.19)*** (0.20)*** 
  (0.33)* (0.35)* (0.28)*  (0.25)**  (0.29)* (0.29)*  (0.21)**  (0.32)* 
control  1.4         
  ( 1 . 2 8 )          
  ( 0 . 5 8 ) * *          
Trust   0.88            
   (0.45)*            
    (0.58)        
Obedience     -1.42       
     (0.44)***       
     (0.42)**       
Respest      2.13      
      (0.48)***      
      (0.36)***      
pc_culture         0.71      
       (0.15)***     
       (0.15)***     
sum_culture        0.87    
        (0.19)***    
        (0.19)***    
pc_children         0.86   
         (0.17)***   
         ( 0 . 2 8 ) * *    
pc_culture_pos          0.83 
          (0.20)*** 
          (0.12)*** 
Obs  69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Adj R-squared  0.46 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.58 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary correlations within countries) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimation method: OLS weighted by numbers of individuals polled in each region. Country dummy variables are always included Table 5 – Income, culture and institutions across countries 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Dep. variable  logyl  gadp pc_culture logyl  gadp pc_culture logyl  gadp 
             
pc_culture  1.44  0.34  1.23  0.41  4.68  0.70 
  (0.26)*** (0.05)***    (0.41)*** (0.08)***    (1.41)*** (0.25)** 
protestant     0.94         
     (0.17)***          
log-mortality          -0.18     
          (0.07)**     
Estimation  OLS  OLS OLS 2SLS  2SLS OLS 2SLS  2SLS 
Obs.  46  47 58 46  47 20 20  20 
Adj.R2  0.40  0.51     0.49  0.25   
Standard  errors  in  parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
column 3 is the first stage specification for columns 4 and 5  
column 6 is the first stage specification for columns 7 and 8           Table 6 – Constraints on the Executive (1600-1850) and first principal component  
Country  Region  institutions_1600 institutions_1700 institutions_1750 institutions_1800 institutions_1850  Pc_institutions 
Belgium VLAAMS  GEWEST  2 2 2 4 5  0.265 
Belgium REGION  WALLONNE  2 2 2 4 5  0.265 
Belgium  REG.BRUXELLES-CAP./BRUSSELS HFDST.GEW.  2 2 2 4 5  0.265 
France  ILE DE FRANCE  1 1 1 4 5  -0.613 
France NORTH  FR  1 1 1 4 5  -0.613 
France EAST  FR  1 1 1 4 5  -0.613 
France WEST  FR  1 1 1 4 5  -0.613 
France SOUTH  WEST  FR  1 1 1 4 5  -0.613 
France  SOUTH EAST FR  1 1 1 4 5  -0.613 
France MEDITERREAN  FR  1 1 1 4 5  -0.613 
France  PARIS BASIN EAST/WEST  1 1 1 4 5  -0.613 
Italy  PIEMONTE - VALLLE D'AOSTA  2 2 1 1 3  -1.061 
Italy LIGURIA  5 5 5 2 3  2.049 
Italy LOMBARDIA  3 3 2 2 1  -0.370 
Italy  TRENTINO ALTO ADIGE - VENETO - FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA  5 5 5 1 1  1.420 
Italy EMILIA-ROMAGNA  2 2 2 2 1  -0.994 
Italy TOSCANA  2 2 1 1 1  -1.469 
Italy  UMBRIA - MARCHE  1 1 1 1 1  -2.093 
Italy LAZIO  1 1 1 1 1  -2.093 
Italy CAMPANIA  1 1 1 1 1  -2.093 
Italy  ABRUZZI - MOLISE - BASILICATA  1 1 1 1 1  -2.093 
Italy PUGLIA  1 1 1 1 1  -2.093 
Italy CALABRIA  1 1 1 1 1  -2.093 
Italy  SICILIA - SARDEGNA  1 1 1 1 1  -2.093 
Netherlands  NOORD NEDERLAND - GRONINGEN  5 5 5 4 6  3.104 
Netherlands OOST  NEDERLAND  5 5 5 4 6  3.104 
Netherlands WEST  NEDERLAND  5 5 5 4 6  3.104 
Netherlands ZUID  NEDERLAND  5 5 5 4 6  3.104 
Portugal NORTE  2 2 2 2 3  -0.585 
Portugal CENTRO  (P)  2 2 2 2 3  -0.585 
Portugal  LISBOA E VALE DO TEJO  2 2 2 2 3  -0.585 
Portugal ALGARVE  2 2 2 2 3  -0.585 
Portugal ALENTEJO  2 2 2 2 3  -0.585 
Portugal MADEIRA  2 2 2 2 3  -0.585 
Portugal AZORE  ISLANDS  2 2 2 2 3  -0.585 
Spain GALICIA  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 
Spain ASTURIAS-CANTABRIA  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 
Spain PAIS  VASCO  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 
Spain  NAVARRA - RIOJA  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 Country  Region  institutions_1600 institutions_1700 institutions_1750 institutions_1800 institutions_1850  Pc_institutions 
Spain ARAGON  3 2 1 2 4  -0.314 
Spain MADRID  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 
Spain CASTILLA-LEON  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 
Spain CASTILLA-LA  MANCHA  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 
Spain EXTREMADURA  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 
Spain CATALUNA  3 2 1 2 4  -0.314 
Spain COMUNIDAD  VALENCIANA  3 2 1 2 4  -0.314 
Spain BALEARES  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 
Spain ANDALUCIA  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 
Spain MURCIA  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 
Spain CANARIAS  1 1 1 2 4  -1.260 
UK NORTH  UK  3 5 6 7 7  3.582 
UK EAST  MIDLANDS  3 5 6 7 7  3.582 
UK EAST  ANGLIA  3 5 6 7 7  3.582 
UK  SOUTH EAST UK  3 5 6 7 7  3.582 
UK SOUTH  WEST  UK  3 5 6 7 7  3.582 
UK WEST  MIDLANDS  3 5 6 7 7  3.582 
UK NORTH  WEST  UK  3 5 6 7 7  3.582 
UK WALES  3 5 6 7 7  3.582 
UK SCOTLAND  3 5 6 7 7  3.582 
UK NORTHERN  IRELAND  2 4 5 6 6  2.278 
UK  YORKSHIRE AND HUMBERSIDE  3 5 6 7 7  3.582 
West Germany  BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG  2 2 2 2 4  -0.381 
West Germany  BAYERN  1 1 1 1 3  -1.685 
West Germany  BREMEN HAMBURG  3 3 3 3 4  0.718 
West Germany  HESSEN  3 1 1 1 1  -1.449 
West Germany  NIEDERSACHSEN  1 1 1 1 1  -2.093 
West Germany  NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN  1 1 1 1 1  -2.093 
West Germany  RHEINLAND-PFALZ SAARLAND  1 1 1 1 1  -2.093 
West Germany  SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN  1 1 1 1 1  -2.093 
 Table 7 – Correlation coefficients among regions (all variables are expressed in deviations from country means) 
 
 yp9500  school  urb_rate1850  literacy  pc_institutions pc_culture pc_culture_pos pc_children 
school  0.22         
urb_rate1850  0.41  0.11        
literacy  0.53  0.2  0.25       
pc_institutions  0.41  0.11  0.22  0.34      
pc_culture  0.51 0.20 0.19 0.46 0.53       
pc_culture_pos  0.49 0.04 0.09 0.46 0.59 0.88     
pc_children  0.46 0.16 0.21 0.32 0.45 0.85 0.60   
sum_culture  0.52 0.22 0.19 0.46 0.54 0.97 0.86 0.88 
 
 Table 8 - Literacy, political history and output: reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. variable  yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 yp9500 
school  0.46 0.54 0.42 0.43 0.43 
  (0.50) (0.36) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) 
  (0.22)* (0.11)*** (0.20)*  (0.20)*  (0.21)* 
urb_rate1850  0.55 0.62 0.49 0.49 0.49 
  (0.21)** (0.22)*** (0.21)**  (0.21)**  (0.21)** 
  (0.33) (0.23)** (0.29)  (0.29)  (0.29) 
literacy  0.94  0.81  0.81  0.81 
  (0.24)***  (0.24)***  (0.24)***  (0.24)*** 
  (0.28)**  (0.23)**  (0.24)**  (0.24)** 
pc_institutions   10.71  7.21     
   (3.71)***  (3.71)*     
   (1.32)***  (4.42)     
Institutions_average      9.93   
      (5.14)*   
      (6.02)   
Institutions_weighted       10.33 
       (5.50)* 
       (6.14) 
Obs  67 69 67 67 67 
Adj R-squared  0.56 0.51 0.58 0.58 0.57 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary correlations within countries) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimation method: OLS. Country dummy variables are always included 
 Table 9 – Culture and output: instrumental variables estimates, unweighted 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. variable  pc_culture yp9500 pc_culture yp9500 pc_culture yp9500  sum_culture  yp9500 
urb_rate1850  0.03 0.48 0.02 0.48 0.02 0.48 0.02 0.49 
  (0.16) (0.22)** (0.16) (0.22)** (0.16) (0.22)** (0.12) (0.21)** 
  (0.14) (0.26) (0.15) (0.26) (0.15) (0.26) (0.11)  (0.25)* 
pc_culture   1.07  1.08  1.09    
   (0.26)***  (0.26)***  (0.27)***    
   (0.34)**  (0.34)**  (0.34)**    
sum_culture          1.38 
          (0.33)*** 
          ( 0 . 4 6 ) * *  
literacy  0.48  0.48  0.48  0.35  
  (0.19)**  (0.19)**  (0.19)**  (0.14)**  
  (0.18)**  (0.18)**  (0.18)**  (0.14)**  
pc_institutions  10.16        8.02   
  (2.82)***        (2.14)***   
  (2.24)***        (1.94)***   
institutions_average     13.88       
     (3.92)***       
     (3.28)***       
institutions_weighted       14.41     
       (4.22)***     
       (3.92)***     
Obs  67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Adj R-squared  0.76  0.76  0.75  0.78  
F statistics  13.55  13.29  12.76  13.98  
Chi2(1) p-value   0.18  0.19  0.20  0.14 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary correlations within countries) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country dummy variables and school are always included in the first and second stage regressions 
Estimation method: 2SLS. First stage in odd columns, second stage in even columns.  
F statistics is F-test of the excluded instruments. Chi2(1) is the value of the Sargan statistic testing the over-identifying restriction. Table 10 – Culture and output: instrumental variables estimates, unweighted 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. variable  trust  yp9500  obedience  yp9500 respect yp9500 control yp9500 
urb_rate1850  -0.09 0.91 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 0.70 0.03 0.19 
  (0.06) (0.32)*** (0.06)  (0.48)  (0.06) (0.21)*** (0.03)  (0.39) 
  (0.06) (0.45)*  (0.05)* (0.41)  (0.04)  (0.17)***  (0.03)  (0.32) 
trust   4.83            
    (1.69)***        
    (1.44)**        
obedience      -5.66      
      (2.19)***      
      (1.61)***      
respect        3.05    
        (0.96)***    
        (0.76)***    
control          10.10 
          (3.82)*** 
          (2.99)*** 
literacy  0.13  -0.14  0.02  0.06  
  (0.07)*  (0.07)*   (0.07)    (0.04)   
  0.08   (0.04)**    (0.06)    (0.01)***   
pc_institutions  1.99  -1.32  3.69  1.01  
  (1.13)*   (1.13)    (0.99)***   (0.56)*  
  (0.72)**    (0.87)   (0.36)***  (0.25)***  
Obs  67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Adj R-squared  0.63  0.76  0.61  0.55  
F statistics  4.47  3.35  7.97  4.00  
Chi2(1) p-value   0.59  0.96   0.003***   0.53 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary correlations within countries) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country dummy variables and school are always included in the first and second stage regressions 
Estimation method: 2SLS. First stage in odd columns, second stage in even columns.  
F statistics is F-test of the excluded instruments. Chi2(1) is the value of the Sargan statistic testing the over-identifying restriction. 
 Table 11 – Conditional culture and output: instrumental variables estimates, weighted by inverse of SE of conditional culture 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dep. variable  cond_pc_culture yp9500 cond_pc_children yp9500 cond_pc_culture_pos  yp9500  cond_sum_culture yp9500 
urb_rate1850  -0.06 0.61  0.06  0.5  -0.17  0.76  -0.06  0.62 
  (0.14) (0.21)***  (0.15)  (0.23)**  (0.11)  (0.20)***  (0.12)  (0.21)*** 
  (0.10) (0.28)*  (0.13)  (0.27)  (0.07)**  (0.25)**  (0.09)  (0.28)* 
literacy  9.67   8.2    9.78    8.06   
  (2.59)***   (2.74)***   (2.04)***    (2.17)***   
  (2.17)***   (1.41)***   (1.77)***    (1.81)***   
pc_institutions  0.57   0.33   0.46    0.48   
  (0.17)***   (0.18)*    (0.13)***    (0.14)***   
  (0.18)**   (0.14)**   (0.12)***    (0.15)**   
cond_pc_culture   1.07             
   (0.26)***             
   (0.30)***             
cond_pc_children       1.41        
       (0.39)***         
       (0.46)**         
cond_pc_culture_pos          1.14     
          (0.28)***     
          (0.31)***     
cond_sum_culture              1.28 
              (0.32)*** 
              (0.36)*** 
Obs  67 67  67 67  67  67  67  67 
Adj R-squared  0.79   0.65   0.81    0.79   
F statistics  16.73   7.97    22.73    16.65   
Chi2(1) p-value   0.4   0.20    0.22   0.41 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary correlations within countries) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country dummy variables and school are always included in the first and second stage regressions 
Estimation method: 2SLS. First stage in odd columns, second stage in even columns.  
F statistics is F-test of the excluded instruments. Chi2(1) is the value of the Sargan statistic testing the over-identifying restriction. 
 Table 12 – Culture and growth: instrumental variables estimates, unweighted 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. variable  pc_culture  growth growth growth growth Growth growth growth 
lyp_77  12.32 -1.16 -1.09 -1.03 -1.03 -1.26 -1.17 -1.15 
  (11.05)  (0.31)*** (0.44)** (0.32)*** (0.42)** (0.44)***  (0.37)***  (0.30)*** 
  (13.71) (0.61)* (0.61)*  (0.62)  (0.59)  (0.82)  (0.79)  (0.61)* 
urb_rate1850  -0.035 0.005 -0.003 0.008 0.001 0.013 0.004 0.008 
  (0.168) (0.004)  (0.000)***  (0.004)*  (0.007) (0.007)** (0.005)  (0.004)* 
  (0.192)  (0.003)*  (0.003)*  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) 
pc_institution  9.59         
  (2.86)***         
  (2.23)***         
literacy  0.39         
  (0.20)*         
  ( 0 . 2 2 )          
pc_culture    0.017        
    (0.006)***        
    (0.007)*        
obedience     0.02          
     (0.007)***          
      (0.009)*       
respect       -0.082      
       (0.044)*      
       (0.030)**      
control        0.042     
        (0.021)**     
        (0.014)**     
trust         0.146    
         (0.076)*    
         (0.092    
pc_children          0.078   
          (0.036)**   
          (0.037)*   
pc_culture_pos           0.023 
           (0.010)** 
           (0.010)* 
Obs 67  67 67 67 67 67 67 67 




0.52 0.78  0.03**  0.85 0.86 0.27 0.37 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary correlations within countries).  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country dummy variables and school are always included in the first and second stage regressions.  
Estimation method: 2SLS.Only second stage in reported.   
F statistics is F-test of the excluded instruments from the first stage regressions.  
Chi2(1) is the value of the Sargan statistic testing the over-identifying restriction. Table 13 – Culture and output: sensitivity analysis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. variable  pc_culture yp9500  yp9500  yp9500 
urb_rate1850  -0.05 0.33 0.45 0.48 
  (0.18) (0.22)  (0.27)* (0.19)** 
  (0.16)  (0.28)  (0.31) (0.28) 
        
pc_culture    0.82  1.69 0.71 
    (0.27)***  (0.65)*** (0.33)** 
   (0.41)*  (0.90)  (0.57) 
       
pc_institutions  9.94   -9.92  
  (2.88)***   (9.17)  
  (2.28)***   (15.09)  
       
literacy  0.43     0.47 
  (0.21)**     (0.31) 
  (0.24)     (0.52) 
      
agr_share  -0.22 -0.75    
  (0.32) (0.40)*    
  (0.18)  (0.55)    
Obs  64 64 67 67 
Adj R-squared  0.73      
F statistics  9.69   13.55  13.55 
Chi2(1) p-value   0.35    
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary correlations within countries) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country dummy variables and school are always included in the first and second stage regressions 
F statistics is F-test of the excluded instruments from the first stage regressions. 
Chi2(1) is the value of the Sargan statistic testing the over-identifying restriction. 
 
Columns (1) and (2): agr_share treated as additional exogenous variable 
Columns (3) and (4): just identified model with only one instrument 
  Table 14.  Montecarlo simulation of estimated Sargan statistics for over-id test 
 
DGP: (1)  Y = αo +βo X + δo C
* + e ;   (2)  C
* = α1 +β1 X + λ1 Z1 + λ2 Z2     (3)    C = C
* + v  
 
Sargan statistics estimated from:  (1)’  Y = αo +βo X + δo C + e     (2)’  C = α1 +β1 X + λ1 Z1 + λ2 Z2 
 + v 
 
True value of  δo:  0.21 
Cor(e, Z1) Cor(e, Z2)  Estimated bias  
(%  δo) 
Distribution of Estimated Sargan Statistics 
    Average  10
th pc  20
th pc  30
th pc  40
th pc  60
th pc  80
th pc  90
th pc 
                   
0 0  0  1.14  0.01  0.06  0.16  0.29  0.83  1.84  3.32 
0.4 0  61%  9.80  2.64  4.17  5.77  7.40  10.74  14.68  17.87 
0 0.4  97%  6.84  1.09  2.32  3.46  4.59  7.34  10.92  13.32 
0.4 0.4  161%  1.48  0.02  0.10  0.24  0.40  1.09  2.36  3.86 
 
True value of  δo:  0.86 
Cor(e, Z1) Cor(e, Z2)  Estimated bias  
(%  δo) 
Distribution of Estimated Sargan Statistics 
    Average  10
th pc  20
th pc  30
th pc  40
th pc  60
th pc  80
th pc  90
th pc 
                   
0 0  0  1.22  0.02  0.10  0.21  0.34  0.89  2.11  3.49 
0.4 0  15%  4.92  0.34  1.01  1.82  2.68  4.69  8.36  11.21 
0 0.4  24%  3.71  0.10  0.42  0.09  1.60  3.46  6.29  9.04 
0.4 0.4  40%  1.34  0.02  0.07  0.17  0.33  0.95  2.22  3.66 
 
The DGP uses the true value of the vector of controls X. The randomly generated variables (e, v, Z1, Z2) match the first and second moments of the 
corresponding observed or estimated variables, where Z1 matches the moments of Literacy and Z2  matches the moments of pc_institutions. The DGP 
also imposes Cor(Z1,Z2 ) =0.4, to match the observed correlation between these two variables. The coefficients in the DGP are those obtained from the 
OLS estimate of (2) and the 2SLS estimate of (1), except for the value of δo, which is as indicated above. The simulation is replicated 1000 times.  The 
correlation between Zi and e is as indicated in the first two columns of both panels.  Table 15.  Referendum on the Italian monarchy, history and culture 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. variable  pro-monarchy pro-monarchy pro-monarchy  pc_culture  pc_culture 
       
literacy  -0.57  -0.40    
  (0.24)**   (0.32)    
pc_institutions   -6.64  -3.43    
   (3.13)*  (3.97)     
pro-monarchy      -1.01  -2.12 
      (0.37)**  (0.80)** 
       
Estimation  OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
Obs.  13 13 13 13 13 
Adj  R2  0.28 0.23 0.27 0.36   
Standard  errors  in  parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
In column 5, the first stage specification is that of column 3 
Sample:  Italian  regions  only      








































































Figure 2b. Cultural map of Europe in the 1990sFigure 3. 
OLS residuals, after controlling for country FE, school and 
urb_1850
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